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ARTICLES
Corporate Risk Analysis:
A Reckless Act?
W. Kip Viscusi*
Balancing of risk and cost lies at the heart of standard negligence tests and
policy analysis approaches to government regulation. Notwithstanding the de-
sirability of using a benefit-cost approach to assess the merits of safety meas-
ures, in many court cases juries appear to penalize corporations for having
done a risk analysis in instances in which the company decided not to make a
safety improvement after the analysis indicated the improvement was unwar-
ranted Automobile accident cases provide the most prominent examples of
such juror sanctions. This paper tests the effect of corporate risk analyses ex-
perimentally by using a sample of almost 500juror-eligible citizens. Each in-
dividual considered an automobile accident scenario, but these scenarios dif-
fered in terms of whether the company undertook a risk analysis and in terms of
the nature of the risk analysis. Somewhat surprisingly, even sound benefit-cost
analyses of safety measures did not reduce the likelihood of punitive damages.
If a company follows the procedures used by government agencies and uses a
higher value of life in its analyses, the penalty levied on the corporation in-
creases. Internal use of higher value of life numbers serves as an anchor that
boosts rather than reduces jury awards.
[Editorial note-the Stanford Law Review has solicited comments to this piece
that will be published in forthcoming issues.]
* John F. Cogan, Jr. Professor of Law and Economics, Director of the Program on Empirical
Legal Studies, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA 02138, phone: 617-496-0019, fax: 617-495-
3010, e-mail: kip@law.harvard.edu. This research was supported by the Sheldon Seevak Research
Fund, the Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business at Harvard Law School, and a grant from
the Exxon Corporation. Jahn Hakes, Amy Semet, Nathan Drake, and Edwin U provided valuable
comments and research assistance. Gary Schwartz and Reid Hastie provided excellent comments.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1999, a Los Angeles jury imposed a $4.8 billion punitive damages
award on General Motors for a case involving severe bums to passengers in a
1979 Chevrolet Malibu., This award, which is the largest punitive award
ever in a personal injury case,2 arose in part because the company had un-
dertaken an explicit analysis of the types of fire risks and design change costs
associated with bum injuries.3 The main issue raised by this award is
whether, in fact, a corporation is being irresponsible if it undertakes a risk
analysis and chooses not to make an unbounded cost commitment to safety.
On a personal level, the approach of accepting risk tradeoffs is implicit
in our daily lives. We take chances all the time. We ride in motor vehicles,
fly on planes, eat potentially risky foods, and live in an environment that is
not risk-free. Some tradeoffs of this kind are inevitable as we seek to strike
an appropriate balance between the harm inflicted by risks and the benefits
such activities offer for our lives. The task for the individual is to make
1. See Andrew Pollack, Paper Trail Haunts GM After It Loses Injury Suit: An Old Memo
Hinted at the Price of Safety, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1999, at A12 [hereinafter Pollack, Paper Trail];
Andrew Pollack, $4.9 Billion Jury Verdict in GM Fuel Tank Case: Penalty Highlights Cracks in
Legal System, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1999, at A8 [hereinafter Pollack, Jury Verdict].
2. See Pollack, Paper Trail, supra note 1, at A12; Ann W. O'Neill, Henry Weinstein & Eric
Malnic, GM Ordered to Pay $4.9 Billion in Crash Verdict Liability, L.A. TIMES, July 10, 1999, at
Al ("Legal experts said the verdict was the largest ever in a personal injury case.").
3. See Pollack, Paper Trail, supra note 1, at A12.
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those personal decisions that confer sufficient benefits to outweigh the asso-
ciated risks.
When faced with options that have different levels of safety, we often
pay a higher price for safer products, though not without limit. Millions of
consumers purchase cars with antilock brakes and protective side air bags,
but few of us have such an unlimited concern for safety that we purchase a
tank-like Hummer vehicle. The degree of concern for safety that consumers
manifest in turn sends signals to corporations in terms of the kinds of goods
and levels of safety that we value. The risk tradeoffs that we are willing to
make in effect set the price for safety in the market and provide guidance to
corporations, which must supply the products and services we purchase. If
corporations generate products that create more hazards than we want to bear
given the product price, or include unnecessary safety features that we do not
value, then the product risk mix will not be successful in the marketplace.
Thus, the task of corporations is to assess the risks of products and activities
and to determine which safety efforts are worthwhile and in line with con-
sumer preferences. For risks arising in a market trade with the party bearing
the risk, informed consumer choices will lead to efficient risk levels. Not all
risks, however, are priced in the market. Environmental hazards are an ex-
ample of risks that are not. In this instance, government regulation can be
used to provide appropriate incentives.
The formal mechanism for making tradeoff judgments is a risk analysis
that outlines the pluses and minuses of different safety options. Risk analysis
consists of a variety of different levels of analyses. First, risk analysis in-
volves assessing the magnitude of the hazard. Is it a serious threat or a minor
background risk? Second, are the risk-reducing policies selected cost-
effective; i.e., do they achieve the greatest risk reduction possible for the
amount of funds expended? Third, do the policies pass a benefit-cost test?
Do the societal benefits of risk reduction outweigh the costs? Firms' interest
in profits will lead them to choose the most cost-effective option, and risk
awareness by consumers will lead firms to adopt risk reduction efforts that
pass a benefit-cost test. However, in the absence of informed and rational
choice, firms may not adopt all safety improvements that are efficient in
terms of benefits exceeding costs-a relationship that is tested through neg-
ligence tests in the court and benefit-cost analyses in the policy arena.4
4. See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 41-42 (2d ed.
1989) (arguing that courts choose a standard of care in negligence actions that corresponds to the
efficient outcome); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 288-89 (5th ed. 1998)
(arguing that in the common law system, wrongful conduct is equivalent to inefficient conduct);
John W. Wade, On The Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.J. 825, 837-38
(1973) (offering a list of factors to weigh when determining whether a product is "unreasonably
dangerous'). See generally STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFEC-
TIVE RISK REGULATION (1993) (proposing new institutional solutions for calculating, regulating,
and reducing health risks).
Feb. 2000]
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Any systematic attempt to trade off costs and risk-reduction benefits may
appear to be a cold-blooded calculation invented by economists.5 Seeking
the right tradeoff between risk and cost is not an abstract economic exercise,
but lies at the heart of the real choices that must be made. Indeed, we want
corporations to think about risks in a systematic manner and to undertake
such calculations to ensure that there is appropriate risk balancing that is suf-
ficiently protective. We all benefit when corporations select the level of
safety that correctly reflects our own concern with safety and the costs of
providing it. The merits of the analysis and the ultimate balance struck
should be the main manner of concern, not whether undertaking a systematic
analysis allegedly reflects a cold-blooded attitude towards human life. Of
course, the fact that companies have undertaken such balancing does not im-
ply that they should be vindicated on economic grounds. Even armed with
an extensive risk analysis, companies may fail to make sufficiently protective
decisions. But liability for corporate behavior should hinge on the risk and
cost decisions, not on whether the firm undertook a risk analysis. We want
to encourage corporations to do such systematic thinking about risk and cost.
The fact that they have done such analyses and have perhaps erred in the
process should not itself be regarded as a reckless act. Indeed, our society
will only become safer if we think carefully about safety and make the right
choices given our limited resources.
A major difficulty arises if a company that undertakes a risk analysis and
yet proceeds with a potentially dangerous act or a risky product triggers a
bias among jurors against it simply for having undertaken the risk analysis.
Such biases might be especially pronounced in situations in which there is a
general anti-corporate bias or a suspicion of the motives underlying corpo-
rate decisions.6 Undertaking explicit risk-cost tradeoffs, which in effect bal-
ance lives lost and environmental damage against monetary costs, may of-
fend jurors' sensibilities. The fact that a company has undertaken a risk
analysis-even a sound analysis-may lead jurors to award punitive dam-
ages rather than compensatory damages alone. The highly charged atmos-
5. See Memorandum in Support of the State's Motion for Ruling in Limine, or, Alternatively,
for Partial Summary Judgment at 21, 23, In Re Mike Moore, Attorney General ex rel. State of Mis-
sissippi Tobacco Litig. (filed Aug. 11, 1995, in the Chancery Court of Jackson County, Miss.) (No.
94-1429) (on file with the Stanford Law Review) (describing my argument that costs saved as a
result of the deaths allegedly caused by smoking should offset the state's restitutionary claims for
the cost of treating cigarette-related diseases as "base, evil and corrupt," "aldn to robbing the graves
of the Mississippi smokers who died from tobacco-related illness," and "an offense to human de-
cency, an affront to justice, uncharacteristic of civilized society, and unquestionably contrary to
public policy").
6. See Peter Aronson, David E. Rovella & Bob Van Voris, Jurors: A Biased, Independent Lot,
NAT'L L.J., Nov. 2, 1998, at Al (stating that a 1998 National Law Journal-DecisionQuest poll
found that people often think the worst of corporate actions: "Three out of four people said they
believe executives of big companies often try to cover up harm they do, and more than one in five
said they could not be a fair juror if a tobacco company were one of the parties to a case they were
considering.").
[Vol. 52:547
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phere of many court proceedings often prompts juries to impose large awards
to send corporations a message. Such message-sending has the purported
intent of generating incentives for safety. As a former president of the Con-
sumer Attorneys of California put it: "The purpose of punitive damages is to
deter despicable acts by corporate America."
7
But what are these "despicable acts"? In some cases, the alleged despi-
cable act may be the actual undertaking of a risk analysis itself rather than a
failure to strike an appropriate risk-cost balance in its product safety or envi-
ronmental risk choices. A prominent example is the recent case of Sergio
Jimenez, who was killed in his Chrysler Minivan because of an allegedly
defective rear-door latch. In 1994, Sergio Jimenez, who was six years old,
was riding unbuckled in the back seat of a 1985 Dodge Caravan in Charles-
ton, South Carolina. As his mother ran a red light, her van was struck on the
side by a Honda that was traveling under fifteen miles per hour. The van
rolled over, the rear door opened, and Sergio Jimenez was thrown to the
street and died. The plaintiffs claimed that the door lock was defective, and
more importantly, that Chrysler had analyzed the defect and failed to repair
it. 8
Jimenez v. Chrysler Corp. led to a $250 million punitive damages award
against Chrysler Corporation.9 The company was faulted not only for the
defective door latch, but also for trading off risk against cost. In Chrysler's
view, the defect posed no significant risk, but the cost would have been
$100,000 for a one-time tooling cost, plus $0.50 per vehicle for the new
part.10 In such instances, jurors are unlikely to compare the costs and the
expected benefits, given the probability of an accident. Instead, they may
compare the $0.50 per vehicle cost With an identifiable death, between which
there is a stark difference. The plaintiffs attorneys demonized Chrysler's
analysis in their post-trial memorandum: "Chrysler officials at the highest
level coldbloodedly [sic] calculated that acknowledging the problem and
fixing it would be more expensive, in terms of bad publicity and lost sales,
than concealing the defect and litigating the wrongful death suits that inevi-
tably would result."'1
7. Wayne McClean, Suit-Happy California? It's a 'Myth', S.F. CHRON., Mar. 8, 1995, at A21;
see also Alex Kozinski, The Case of Punitive Damages v. Democracy, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 1995,
at Al 8 (raising concerns about the role that large punitive damage awards play in shaping public
policy).
8. See Nichole M. Christian, Angelo B. Henderson & Asra Q. Nomani, Chrysler Is Told to
Pay $262.5 Million by Jurors in Minivan-Accident Trial, WALL. ST. J., Oct. 9, 1997, at A3.
9. See Jimenez v. Chrysler Corp., No. 2: 96-1269-11, 1997 WL 743644, at *1 (LRP Jury)
(S.C. Oct. 8, 1997).
10. See Donald C. Dilworth, Fourteen Jurors Punish Chrysler for Hiding Deadly Defect,
TRIAL, Feb. 1998, at 14.
11. Id.
Feb. 2000]
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Suppose that the company did the analysis correctly, in a manner in line
with contemporary sound and responsible economic principles. Would the
existence of the risk analysis itself make jurors more likely to conclude that
the corporation acted recklessly by placing excessively risky products on the
market? To explore this issue, I present new empirical evidence based on an
original survey that I undertook with almost 500 juror-eligible citizens. Ide-
ally, jurors should take into account responsible risk-cost balancing. A cor-
porate risk analysis that showed that the benefits of the safety improvement
did not exceed the costs should not only eliminate the possibility of punitive
damages, but also eliminate negligence-based claims. Unfortunately, any
such analysis seems to have adverse effects. Undertaking even a sound risk
analysis in line with that used by government regulators leads mock jurors to
impose greater sanctions for risk decisions, despite the fact that these choices
may have struck an appropriate risk-cost balance.
This behavior of mock jurors is not consistent with the intent of tort law.
There are no existing legal provisions indicating that firms should be pun-
ished for having undertaken a risk analysis. The type of behavior reflected
by the mock jurors is also borne out in actual cases, such as Jimenez v.
Chrysler Corp. and other cases discussed below. A detailed review of in-
stances in which firms have undertaken risk analyses indicates that such
careful risk and cost assessments tend to affect firms adversely. The well-
known example involving the stigmatization of Ford following the release of
the internal Ford Pinto safety documents has been followed repeatedly in
more recent cases.
Adopting legal guidelines whereby defendants will not be adversely af-
fected by having done a risk analysis may not be fully effective given jurors'
susceptibility to hindsight bias. More sweeping legal reforms, such as taking
punitive damages out of the hands ofjurorsl2 or abolishing punitive damages
altogether for corporate risk decisions,13 are needed.
I. THE JUROR JUDGMENT SURVEY
To explore how jurors react to the presence of corporate risk analyses of
product hazards, I constructed a survey in which juror-eligible citizens con-
sidered alternative accident scenarios. Some mock jurors considered cases in
which no benefit-cost analysis was performed, and other jurors considered
12. See Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman & David Schkade, Assessing Punitive Damages
(with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2121 (1998) ("There is good
reason to believe... that if punitive damages are designed to produce optimal deterrence, juries
should be eliminated.").
13. See W. Kip Viscusi, Why There Is No Defense of Punitive Damages, 87 GEo. L.L 381
(1998); W. Kip Viscusi, The Social Costs of Punitive Damages Against Corporations in Environ-
mental and Safety Torts, 87 GEo. L.J. 285 (1998).
[Vol. 52:547
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variants of a case in which the company did perform such an analysis. By
comparing the responses of jurors across the different case treatments, I as-
certained the incremental influence of undertaking an economic analysis.
The sample consisted of 489 adults. The appendix presents the sample
characteristics in more detail. The sample population had a mean age of
forty-five and a median education level of some college; two-thirds of the
sample participants were female. Subjects were recruited to participate by a
survey research firm in Phoenix, Arizona, which reimbursed them for taking
part. Detailed multiple regression analyses, which control for the influence
of demographics, yield similar results to the overall sample comparisons.
The study examined a variety of hypotheses, leading to the five different
scenarios that will be discussed further below. Here I will outline the ex-
perimental structure and the principal hypotheses, which are summarized in
Table 1. All scenarios involved a similar auto accident context. Scenario 1
is the baseline scenario, which will serve as the initial reference point. By
comparing the results in the other scenarios with this control group, one can
ascertain the incremental effect of the risk analysis manipulations as com-
pared to the no-analysis case.
Table 2 outlines five hypotheses that can be tested using the juror results.
Scenario 2 involves auto risks in which the cost-per-life-saved for greater
safety is less than in Scenario 1, but there is no corporate risk analysis in ei-
ther case. One should expect jurors to have a more favorable view of deci-
sions to forego more expensive safety measures (in terms of cost-per-life-
saved). Comparing the results of Scenario 1 with Scenarios 3 through 5 in-
dicates whether a jury views a corporate risk analysis as a responsible act or
one worthy of punishment. Similarly, comparing Scenarios 3 and 4 provides
a test of whether the type of corporate risk analysis matters. In particular,
does it matter whether corporations use court awards as the reference point
for assessing the cost of death or instead use a higher value consistent with
government regulatory analyses? One should expect jurors to look favorably
on corporations using the higher value. From a cognitive standpoint, how-
ever, a higher value might serve as an anchor that raises liability awards.
Comparison of Scenarios 4 and 5 indicates whether company errors affect
the risk assessment component of the analysis. Finally, all scenarios were
run using both four deaths and ten deaths as the accident context to see
whether higher absolute risk levels would lead jurors to impose greater sanc-
tions on the company. Presumably, more accidents for any given level of
operations should be viewed more adversely.
The key questions posed by the scenarios involving risk analyses are
whether mock jurors levy punitive damages and, if so, in what amount. Sce-
nario 2, in which no risk analysis was performed, exemplifies the substantive
context of these decisions:
Feb. 2000]
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A major auto company with annual profits of $7 billion made a line of cars
with a defective electrical system design. This failure has led to a series of fires
in these vehicles that cause ten bum deaths per year. Changing the design to
prevent these deaths would cost $10 million for the 100,000 vehicles affected
per year, or $100 each. The company thought that there might be some risk
from the current design, but did not believe that it would be significant. The
company notes that even with these injuries, the vehicle has one of the best
safety records in its class.
The courts have awarded each of the victim's families $800,000 in dam-
ages to compensate them for the income loss and pain and suffering that re-
sulted. After these lawsuits, the company altered future designs to eliminate the
problem.
By indicating that the product was "defective," the intent was not to
draw a legal conclusion, but simply to indicate that the system failed to oper-
ate in a completely safe manner.14 Moreover, even if the respondents con-
cluded that a defect existed from a legal standpoint, that would be consistent
with the award of compensatory damages. As indicated in the survey text,
the court already had awarded compensatory damages, and the only concern
was whether punitive damages were warranted.
The respondents then considered two questions. First, they were asked
whether punitive damages should be awarded "to punish the company for
reckless behavior." Second, if they chose to award such damages, they were
asked for a dollar amount. They picked from the following possibilities:
$100,000, $1 million, $10 million, $100 million, and some other amount se-
lected by the respondent.
Different groups considered the five different scenarios summarized in
Table 1. In much of the discussion below, these different scenarios will be
pooled into broader categories, since there were no statistically significant
differences among many of the major component groupings. The first broad
category consists of the two scenarios in which the company did not perform
a benefit-cost analysis of the product hazard. In Scenario 1, the company did
not perform the analysis, but the cost-per-life-saved would have been $4
million. In Scenario 2, reproduced in the text above, the details of the sce-
nario were the same except that the cost-per-life-saved was $1 million. One
would expect that jurors would be more likely to levy punitive damages if
the cost-per-life-saved were lower rather than higher because, presumably,
companies would be more remiss if it were cheaper to provide a safe prod-
uct. The expense to the company to provide greater product safety is less
when the cost-per-life-saved is low, making safety expenditures more attrac-
14. For example, BLACK'S LAW DIcIoNARY 429 (7th ed. 1999) defines defect as: "[a]n im-
perfection or shortcoming, esp. in a part that is essential to the operation or safety of a product."
The legal definition is not substantially different from the definition for the word's popular usage:
"an imperfection that impairs worth or utility." WEBSTER's NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 294
(1979).
[Vol. 52:547
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live. Thus, there will be a broader set of circumstances under which safety
improvements are desirable from a societal benefit-cost standpoint. But in
all of the statistical tests using regression results, the level of the cost-per-
life-saved did not have any significant effect on juror decisions to levy puni-
tive damages or on the amount of the award. The fact thdt jurors are unre-
sponsive to the cost-per-life-saved is consistent with the broader theme in the
survey results: The key substantive concerns that one would expect to drive
the jurors' views do not have a statistically significant influence.
The second set of scenarios-Scenarios 3 through 5-consists of those in
which the company performed a benefit-cost analysis of some kind. In Sce-
nario 3, the company valued each life in much the same manner as Ford and
GM in cases discussed below: by using an amount comparable to the com-
pensatory damages amount in similar cases. In particular, Scenario 3 stated
that the company valued each life lost at $800,000. In this scenario, as well
as in Scenarios 4 and 5, the cost that the company would have had to incur to
save a statistical life was $4 million.
In Scenario 4, the company undertook the analysis in a manner that fol-
lows the approach taken by government regulatory agencies. Rather than use
the compensatory damages amount, it used a value-of-life figure based on
society's willingness to pay to prevent small risks of death. Consequently,
this measure goes beyond the value of a person's earnings or the usual
amount of a compensatory damage award. Rather, it reflects the risk-money
tradeoff based on the individual's own willingness to pay for greater safety.
This approach is favored for use throughout the federal government by the
U.S. Office of Management and Budget.15 As described in Scenario 4:
To determine whether the safety improvement was worthwhile, the com-
pany used a value of $3 million per accidental death, which is the value used by
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration in setting auto safety stan-
dards. The company estimated that the annual safety benefits of this safer de-
sign would be $30 million (10 expected deaths at $3 million per death), while
the cost would be $40 million. As a result, the company believed that other
safety improvements might save more lives at less cost.
By comparing the results for Scenario 4 with those in Scenario 3, we can
ascertain whether undertaking the analysis in a rigorous and responsible eco-
nomic fashion has any beneficial influence on how the jurors view a benefit-
cost analysis of product safety designs. Alternatively, comparing Scenario 4
with Scenario 1 makes it possible to ascertain whether performing an analy-
sis helps or hurts the company's position in the eyes of the jury, holding con-
stant the cost-per-life-saved value.
The final survey variant, in Scenario 5, is that in which the company
makes a mistake in assessing the risk component, underestimating the num-
15. See U.S. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 634 (1993).
Feb. 2000]
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ber of deaths by a factor of two. Under this analysis, the company estimates
that the cost-per-life-saved would be $4 million, whereas in fact it is $2 mil-
lion. Since the reference value of life used by the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration is $3 million per life, this error represents the differ-
ence between the analysis passing and failing a benefit-cost test. The com-
pany believed that it passed, but, because of the error, it did not. Comparison
of the results in Scenario 5 with Scenario 4 enables us to determine whether
such errors in a benefit-cost analysis affect juror attitudes toward corporate
risk analysis.
The bottom rows in Tables 1 and 2 indicate the different waves of the
survey. One set of respondents considered the set of five scenarios in which
the total number of lives lost was ten. A second set of respondents consid-
ered identical scenarios, except that the total number of lives lost was four.
The number of lives lost did not have any statistically significant influence
on the responses. Thus, within the ranges examined, neither the cost-per-
life-saved nor the absolute level of risk had any statistically significant influ-
ence on jurors' propensity to award punitive damages.
Table 3 reports the mean values of the jurors' reactions to the five sce-
narios, both in terms of their propensity to award punitive damages, and the
dollar value they choose for such awards. The different versions of the sur-
vey are listed in the first column of Table 3. The table also presents each of
the different scenarios and summarizes the results for the combined group of
two scenarios in which no benefit-cost analysis was performed, the three
scenarios in which there was such a benefit-cost analysis, and all five sce-
narios.
Consider first the frequency with which punitive damages were awarded.
In Scenario 1, the reference scenario in which the cost to save a life was $4
million but no analysis was performed, 85% of these subjects were willing to
award punitive damages. This figure rises to 92% for Scenario 2 in which no
analysis is performed, but the cost to save a life drops to $1 million.16 Over-
all, the two versions of the survey in which there is no analysis performed
had 88% of the subjects awarding punitive damages. Because of this high
base level, the incremental effect of the corporate analysis scenarios will
largely be manifested in damage levels.
One would expect jurors to be more lenient if the company could justify
its actions based on a benefit-cost analysis. The opposite turns out to be the
case. In the three scenarios in which the company did perform a benefit-cost
analysis using either compensatory damages amounts or the willingness to
pay for safety measure for the value of life, the probability of awarding pu-
16. The percentages of jurors willing to award punitive damages in these scenarios are not,
however, statistically different from each other, as indicated by the associated t value of 1.58. See
infra app. tbl. 2.
[Vol. 52:547
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nitive damages ranged from 0.93 to 0.95. These differences are not statisti-
cally significant across the different cases.17 Thus, the character of the
analysis that the company performs does not have a statistically significant
effect. There is, however, a statistically significant difference between Sce-
narios 3, 4, and 5, in which a company does an analysis, and Scenarios 1 and
2, in which it does not. Overall, the scenarios in which a company per-
formed an analysis led to a punitive damages award 94% of the time. That
value is 6% higher than the two cases for which no analysis was performed
and 9% higher than in Scenario 1, in which no analysis was performed and
the cost-per-life-saved was $4 million per life. The variation in the fre-
quency with which jurors award punitive damages is not great because these
frequencies were very high in all of the scenarios. But the direction of the
effect is disturbing, since the mock jurors were doing the opposite of what
juries should do to encourage corporations to think systematically about risk
and cost tradeoffs.
The magnitude of the awards displays considerably more variation. The
last two columns in Table 3 present the geometric mean and the median
award values. I present these statistics rather than the simple average award
amount because a few outliers in which extremely large punitive damages
were awarded-as high as $8 billion per fatality--distort the average. There
is a remarkable difference across the no-analysis and risk-analysis scenarios.
For the two scenarios in which the company does not undertake a benefit-
cost analysis, the value of the awards is almost identical. The geometric
mean value ranges from $2.86 million to $2.95 million, or an average across
the two groups of $2.91 million. The median value is identical for both Sce-
nario 1 and Scenario 2, at $1 million.
As indicated by the bottom rows of Panels A and B of Table 3, the award
amount is roughly 50% greater in situations in which the company performed
a benefit-cost analysis, as compared to the no-analysis scenarios. Overall,
the scenarios in which an analysis was performed led to damages with a
geometric mean value of $4.59 million, as compared to $2.91 million when
no analysis was undertaken. The median values display a more dramatic
pattern: They are $1 million when no analysis is performed and $10 million
when the company does a benefit-cost analysis.
The company's performance changes when it undertakes a benefit-cost
analysis correctly, as in Scenario 4, rather than simply using the value of
compensatory damages as the measure for the value of life, as in Scenario 3.
Based on the economic merits, the company should fare better when it values
life correctly and at a higher amount than when it simply uses the compen-
satory damages value. Additionally, respondents are told that the company's
approach follows that used by the National Highway Traffic Safety Admini-
17. In particular, the highest t value is 0.545.
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stration (NIITSA). But undertaking a sound risk analysis does not prove to
be beneficial to the company's prospects. The propensity of the respondents
to award punitive damages is almost identical-0.93-in each case. But the
level of punitive damages awarded turns out to be greater when the company
performs the analysis correctly than when it simply uses the compensatory
damages value. The geometric mean award value increases from $4.0 mil-
lion in Scenario 3 to $5.3 million in Scenario 4. The median award value is
$3.5 million in Scenario 3, less than half the $10 million median value for
Scenario 4-a statistically significant difference.18
Performing the analysis correctly and valuing life at a higher amount
lead juries to impose greater sanctions than when the company does the
analysis but places a lower value on improvements in safety. How might
such a seemingly unreasonable pattern of behavior arise? The mock jurors
seem to make little distinction with respect to whether there should be an
award of punitive damages. But the higher value-of-life amount used by the
company in Scenario 4 as compared to Scenario 3 provides a dollar anchor
for the jury in determining the appropriate punitive damages award. Some-
what perversely, use of a higher value-of-life estimate in a company's inter-
nal analysis may raise the target award level in jurors' minds. This might be
because they seek to impose damages that will provide a greater safety in-
centive for companies in similar situations as the company in their Scenario,
in the hope that this incentive would lead similarly placed companies in the
future to a different conclusion in their internal analyses. Consequently,
companies are in the bizarre position of risking greater liability if they place
more weight on consumer safety.
Anchoring effects for punitive damages are not unique to this context.
Plaintiffs' attorneys' requests for larger damages tend to increase the dollar
value of the award.19 Such requests are not entirely arbitrary because they
are often accompanied by superficially plausible mathematical formulas,
such as an arbitrary percentage of the firm's profits or sales, that are based on
the purported need to send the company a message. Indeed, recent evidence
indicates that, in fact, jurors may have very little idea how to map their con-
cerns about the corporation's behavior into a dollar amount.20 My results are
even more disturbing, because not only is there an anchoring phenomenon
that is the opposite of the desired effect, but also because responsible risk
analyses should not trigger punitive damages of any kind.
18. A median regression yields a t value of 3.36. A regression using the geometric mean,
however, does not yield a statistically significant t value.
19. See generally Reid Hastie, David A. Schkade & John W. Payne, Juror Judgements in
Civil Cases: Hindsight Effects on Judgments of Liability for Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & Hum.
BEHAV. 597, 597-614 (1999) (providing detailed evidence of this phenomenon).
20. See Sunstein, Kahneman & Schkade, supra note 12, at 2074 (arguing that jurors have
trouble arriving at dollar amounts that are not arbitrary because they are asked to map moral judg-
ments onto an unbounded scale of dollars).
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Finally, consider Scenario 5, in which the company undertook a flawed
benefit-cost analysis. Comparison with the counterpart Scenario 4, in which
there was no such error, suggests that errors are not very consequential. The
jury was somewhat more likely to award punitive damages in the erroneous
analysis case (0.95 probability versus 0.93), but exhibited somewhat lower
proclivities to penalize the firm ($4.5 million in punitive damages for Sce-
nario 5 versus $5.3 million for Scenario 4). Overall, there were no statisti-
cally significant differences between these two scenarios.
More detailed statistical analyses that control for variations in scenario
features and respondent characteristics yield similar results.21 Taking into
account the influence of mock jurors' personal characteristics, such as gender
and education, undertaking a risk analysis increases the probability of a pu-
nitive damages award by 5%. It is noteworthy that the cost-per-life-saved
and the absolute risk level do not have significant effects on the probability
of a punitive damages award: Mock-jurors seem unresponsive to variations
in the underlying risk characteristics. Undertaking a benefit-cost analysis of
risk does not help the company, but instead boosts the punitive damages
awarded by 47%. The cost-per-life-saved and the absolute risk level do not
affect jury behavior significantly.
II. THE RISK-BALANCING REFERENCE POINT
A. Risk Analysis and Liability
What should the negligence standard be and what role should risk analy-
sis play in relation to such a standard? The current legal consensus on this
issue, articulated in a draft document by the American Law Institute, reflects
a desire to balance risk and cost and, indeed, to consider risk-cost tradeoffs
directly:
Under § 4, negligence is defined in terms of the failure to exercise reason-
able care, and reasonable care is explained primarily in terms of the balance
between the magnitude of the foreseeable risk and the burden of precautions
that can eliminate the risk. If the burden is greater than the risk, the actor who
declines to adopt that precaution is not negligent. But if the magnitude of the
risk is somewhat greater than the burden, the actor is negligent for failing to
adopt the precaution.
From this evaluation, two points follow that relate to the meaning of reck-
lessness. The first point is a negative one: the fact that the actor, because of the
burden entailed by a particular precaution, has made a deliberate choice to omit
a precaution and hence to tolerate a risk by no means signifies that the person
has behaved recklessly. Indeed, the fact that such a choice has been made does
21. For a fuller report on these analyses, see generally W. Kip Viscusi, Jurors, Judges, and the
Mistreatment of Risk by the Courts (July 23, 1999) (unpublished working paper, on file with the
Stanford Law Review).
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not even show that the actor has behaved negligently. Rather, the actor is neg-
ligent only for making an unwise choice. In a sense, the very objective of neg-
ligence law is to encourage actors to acknowledge and confront such choices,
and to render these choices wisely rather than unwisely.22
Standard negligence principles call for risk balancing, and firms should
be encouraged to make such judgments explicitly. Ideally, they should not
be faulted additionally for undertaking an erroneous analysis. Undertaldng a
risk analysis before marketing a risky product should not be viewed as reck-
less corporate behavior. Such legal ideals are, however, divorced from the
reality of personal injury and environmental damage cases and the thinldng
of jurors with cognitive biases. The injuries in such cases are more than fi-
nancial abstractions: They often generate powerful emotional responses,
which may be affected by the character of the corporate decisionmaking pro-
cess, as will be shown below.
These competing concerns arise in the American Law Institute's discus-
sion of the role of the actor's knowledge, which is an integral component of
risk analysis: "Nevertheless, if the evidence does show that the actor had
knowledge that its conduct was tortious, this evidence conduces to a finding
that the actor's failure to adopt precautions is highly blameworthy for the
purposes of § 2."23 Companies, of course, may make risk analyses and adopt
behavior that they do not regard as tortious. Juries may, however, disagree,
and if the firm is found negligent then its risk analysis and cognizance of the
risks posed by dangerous products could trigger punitive damages.
To provide levels of safety that protect the public adequately, companies
should institute those safety measures for which the expected benefits exceed
the costs. Cost levels are usually directly measurable; they typically consist
of monetary expenditures and the time spent taking particular precautions.
The benefit component is more complex. Consider a safety device that re-
duces mortality risks to consumers. For simplicity, assume that all of these
calculations are undertaken on a per-consumer basis rather than over the en-
tire product line, in which case one would take into account the total number
of consumers whose lives are at risk and the total cost involved. The ex-
pected benefits of the safety device equal the change in the mortality prob-
ability multiplied by the value of preventing the consumer's death. The
safety device is desirable from an economic efficiency standpoint if the costs
are less than these expected benefits.
Assessing risk levels and how a product alters the risk is not always a
precise science, particularly before the product is marketed. Engineers can
run simulations, and pharmaceutical companies can engage in clinical trials
that may involve substantial groups of prospective users in situations that
22. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. d (Council Draft No. 1, 1998).
23. Id. § 2crnt. g.
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reflect the likely product use. But such pre-market tests are often not fully
informative. Adverse reactions to a drug may not become apparent immedi-
ately, and mechanical defects may develop over time and therefore not be
known to the company before the product is marketed. Also, companies
cannot anticipate all situations in which the product will be used. Neverthe-
less, there is often substantial information that the company can use to form a
risk judgment. Using the information reasonably available at the time of the
risk analysis, the company can assess the change in the fatality probability
that would result from a particular safety improvement.
B. Setting a Price on Safety
Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer uses the example of consumer
spending on auto safety to demonstrate our natural risk-money tradeoffs.24
Would it, for example, be unreasonable to require a safety expenditure that
costs $10 billion per life saved? As Justice Breyer observes, such expendi-
tures would be tantamount to being willing to pay an extra $48,077 for a car
5% safer than those we now drive. The fact that we do not all rush out to
purchase marginally safer cars that are vastly more expensive reflects the
limits we place on safety improvements. Indeed, the tradeoffs revealed by
consumer purchases of used cars indicate that consumers are willing to pay
approximately $3 million for each statistical life saved by the decreased risk
of death offered by the purchase of a safer used car.25
What Justice Breyer's example implies is that there will always be some
product hazards that will not be corrected. The failure to obtain risk-free
products will occur regardless of whether it is the consumer or the producer
who makes the safety decision. At some point, the cost of additional safety
improvements becomes so great that additional safety measures are not
worthwhile.
Indeed, a desire to limit our expenditures on product safety could even
stem from interest in other health-enhancing expenditures. Exorbitant ex-
penditures on motor-vehicle safety, for example, would divert resources that
could have been spent on additional medical care, improved nutrition, or
housing in a safer neighborhood. A substantial literature has developed in
economics demonstrating that excessive safety expenditures in any particular
area are counterproductive.26 We harm our health by diverting inordinate
24. See BREYEP, supra note 4, at 13-14.
25. See Mark K. Dreyfus & W. Kip Viscusi, Rates of Time Preference and Consumer Valua-
tions of Automobile Safety and Fuel Efficiency, 38 J.L. & ECON. 79, 102 (1995) (finding implicit
value of life estimates for automobile owners in the range of $2.6 to $3.7 million).
26. See generally W. KIP VISCUSI, RATIONAL RISK POLICY (1998) (providing an introduction
to the risk-risk literature); Randall Lutter & John F. Morrall II, Health-Health Analysis: A New
Way to Evaluate Health and Safety Regulation, 8 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 43 (1994) (suggesting
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resources to one safety concern instead of allocating our funds across differ-
ent ways of enhancing safety based on the relative efficacy of those expen-
ditures.
In setting a dollar value on human life, economists focus not on identi-
fied lives, but on statistical lives. What matters is not how much we would
pay to prevent a certain death. Rather, the actual benefit being valued is a
prospective statistical death. There is some probability that this product will
cause injury or environmental damage. How much are we willing to pay to
reduce this often small probability by a tiny fraction?
A hypothetical example illustrates how the value-of-life numbers are
generated. Consider a village with a population of 10,000. Suppose that we
learn that one person in the village will die at random. How much would the
average person in the village be willing to contribute to prevent this random
death (assuming that the villagers cannot leave or otherwise escape the risk)?
If each person were willing to contribute $500 to prevent a random death,
they could raise $500 multiplied by 10,000 people, or $5 million. This same
logic has been used to derive estimates based on a large series of studies of
worker behavior, which has been the general approach taken in the econom-
ics literature. Studies focusing on tradeoffs people actually make between
money and risk will consequently be more realistic than survey responses to
hypothetical risks. Controlling for other aspects of the job, hazardous jobs
command a higher price. For a worker facing an annual death risk of one
chance in 10,000 from his or her job, the annual wage premium estimates
range from $300-$700 per year, where these amounts control for other as-
pects of the individual and the job. Put in value-of-life terms, these amounts
imply a value of life of $3 million to $7 million, or a midpoint value of $5
million per statistical life.
These amounts do not imply that the worker would accept certain death
in return for $5 million, nor do they imply that a worker would be willing to
pay $5 million to prevent certain death. Those sums could be quite different.
Rather, they only suggest that when facing very small risks, a value of $5
million per statistical death reflects the person's rate of tradeoff between risk
and money. For the purposes of the discussion below, this willingness-to-
pay approach will be the yardstick used in assessing the value of life.
The use of this methodology to value life is not an arbitrary choice. It
follows the recommended practice for all federal agencies.27 The justifica-
tion for using the willingness-to-pay measure parallels the approach for
valuing any policy's effects. The value of a policy benefit is simply soci-
that exceptionally costly health and safety regulations might worsen health and safety by reducing
other spending on health and safety precautions).
27. See U.S. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, supra note 15, at 633-38 (discussing
the value of life).
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ety's willingness to pay for that benefit.28 In the risk context, it is the will-
ingness to pay for risk reduction. Because the people whose lives are at risk
have the most to lose, the usual reference point for valuing safety is the
willingness of the person at risk to pay for safety.
The value-of-life numbers are considerably higher than the estimates
obtained using only the present value of lost earnings, which is often called
the "human capital" approach. Lost earnings are generally a key component
of compensatory damages amounts. Ignoring the role of discounting, con-
sider a thirty-five-year-old male earning $30,000 per year. That person has
an expected active working life of just under twenty-five years, or a total
value of future earnings of $750,000.29 Whereas the value of future earnings
is under $1 million, the value of life arrived at through the willingness-to-pay
measure is much higher.
When making awards in wrongful death cases, courts focus on the pres-
ent value of future earnings, net of consumption of the deceased and, de-
pending on the jurisdiction, taxes. That amount of money is needed to re-
place the economic loss to the family based on the earnings of the deceased.
But compensatory damages awarded by courts in this manner do not serve
the preventive function reflected in the value-of-life statistics. A value-of-
life figure of $5 million is an appropriate reference point for determining
how much the company should spend per statistical life to prevent an ex-
pected death, even though a typical court award in the case of wrongful death
may be less than $1 million. This distinction was incorporated in the con-
trast between Scenarios 3 and 4, which demonstrated the perverse result that
corporations were penalized for valuing life highly.
C. Problems in Ex Post Jury Assessments of Risk Analyses
Juries might not, in fact, compare expected benefits and costs based on
the state of information before the accident. Once the accident has occurred,
hindsight may taint juror perceptions. Instead of comparing expected bene-
fits and costs, jurors may compare the enormous cost to the victim with the
relatively negligible cost of the safety improvement.
The role of hindsight was apparent in Carroll v. Otis Elevator Co.30 In
1985, a department store escalator came to a sudden stop after an unidenti-
fied child apparently pushed the emergency button. Shirley Carroll, a de-
partment store clerk riding the escalator, fell and injured her knee. She filed
a product liability suit against the escalator manufacturer, claiming that the
28. This is the standard principle for benefit valuation in any context. See generally, e.g.,
EDITH STOKEY & RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS (1978).
29. These worklife statistics are from Table A-l of BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, WORKLIFE ESTIMATES: EFFECTS OF RACE AND EDUCATION 12 (1986).
30. 896 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1990).
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red emergency stop button was defective because it was attractive and acces-
sible to children.31 In the defense's view, having a button that is easy to spot
and reach enhances its role in emergency situations.32
As Judge Frank Easterbrook observed in his concurrence, corporate en-
gineers are better suited to making sound risk tradeoffs than jurors, who are
affected by hindsight bias:
The ex post perspective of litigation exerts a hydraulic force that distorts judg-
ment. Engineers design escalators to minimize the sum of construction, opera-
tion, and injury costs. Department stores, which have nothing to gain from
maiming their customers and employees, willingly pay for cost-effective pre-
cautions....
Come the lawsuit, however, the passenger injured by a stop presents him-
self as a person, not a probability. Jurors see today's injury; persons who would
be injured if buttons were harder to find and use are invisible. Although wit-
nesses may talk about them, they are spectral figures, insubstantial compared to
the injured plaintiff, who appears in the flesh.33
Judge Easterbrook emphasized that companies should undertake risk-
cost balancing in a decision in a case involving burns from hot coffee that
paralleled the highly publicized McDonald's coffee cup case. McMahon v.
Bunn-O-Matic Corp.34 involved a coffee spill by the McMahons while on a
long trip. Jack McMahon bought a cup of coffee in a Styrofoam cup at a
Mobil station. As he poured his coffee into a smaller cup the original cup
collapsed, spilling its contents on Angelina McMahon's lap and causing sec-
ond and third-degree bums. The McMahons' suit against the manufacturer
of the coffeemaker claimed that the maker was defective because the coffee
was too hot.
Judge Easterbrook noted, however, that hot coffee might have more
benefits than costs:
[B]ecause it is costly to serve coffee hot (it takes electricity to keep the hotplate
on), risks could be reduced for a negative outlay. How can it not be negligent
to spend money for the purpose of making a product more injurious? But of
course people spend money to increase their risks all the time-they pay steep
prices for ski vacations; they go to baseball games where flying bats and balls
abound; they buy BB guns for their children knowing that the pellets can maim.
They do these things because they perceive benefits from skiing, baseball, and
target practice.... [W]e must understand the benefits of hot coffee in relation
to its costs. As for costs, the record is silent. We do not know whether severe
bums from coffee are frequent or rare. On the other side of the ledger there are
benefits for all coffee drinkers. Jack McMahon testified that he likes his coffee
hot. Why did the American National Standards Institute set 170' F as the
minimum temperature at which coffee should be held ready to serve? ... With-
31. Seeid. at214.
32. Seeid. at215.
33. Id. at 215-16.
34. 150 F.3d 651 (7th Cir. 1998).
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out some way to compare the benefits of a design change (fewer and less severe
bums) against the costs (less pleasure received from drinking coffee), it is im-
possible to say that designing a coffee maker to hold coffee at 1790 F bespeaks
negligent inattention to the risks.35
As a practical matter, consider the process that a company might under-
take if it wished to complete a comprehensive assessment of the costs and
benefits of a particular safety improvement. It would obtain a thorough un-
derstanding of the risks involved and how the safety device would affect
those risks. If it chose not to adopt a safety measure because the costs ex-
ceeded the benefits, then it would be explicitly trading off lives against
money, just as coffee retailers and coffeemaker manufacturers trade off bums
against quality and profits. Moreover, proceeding in a way that is not risk
free would be to knowingly expose consumers to a probabilistic risk of harm,
even though such actions may be entirely in line with fundamental law and
economics principles for efficient levels of safety.
Unfortunately, knowingly inflicting a risk will trigger certain conditions
that are highlighted for juries with respect to the award of punitive damages.
Consider the following jury instructions for punitive damages pertaining to
willful and wanton conduct:
In order for the conduct of the defendant to constitute willfulness or wan-
tonness, his/her acts must be done under circumstances which show that he/she
was aware from his/her knowledge of existing conditions that it is probable that
injury would result from his/her acts and omissions, and nevertheless proceeded
with reckless indifference as to the consequences and without care for the rights
of others.
The distinction between the two terms, "willful" and "wanton," is that the
word "willful" implies an intent or purpose to cause injury, while "Wanton" ex-
presses a reckless disregard for the consequences of the act.
It is not necessary to find that the defendant deliberately intended to injure
the plaintiff. It is sufficient if the plaintiff proves by the greater weight of the
evidence that the defendant intentionally acted in such a way that the natural
and probable consequence of his act was injury to the plaintiff.36
How will a jury interpret such instructions? Suppose the defendant un-
dertook a thorough risk analysis, yet nevertheless proceeded with a product
that did not incorporate all feasible safety measures because of their inordi-
nate cost. Will a jury find that the defendant's conduct is reckless and
caused an injury to the plaintiff because the defendant chose not to adopt the
safety measure despite knowing of the adverse consequences? Punishing
such responsible corporate risk analyses occurred not only in the mock juror
results but also in the cases examined below.
35. Id. at 658.
36. RONALD W. EADES, JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS 111 (3d ed.
1993).
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D. Risk-Utility Analysis
The procedure by which one compares the benefits of design changes
with the associated costs is not restricted to corporate risk analyses or bene-
fit-cost tests undertaken by the government with respect to prospective
regulations. Such procedures also are embodied with respect to legal tests
for design defects known as risk-utility tests. Such tests involve balancing a
variety of the elements of benefit-cost analysis, but do not involve a formal
benefit-cost test.3 7
Risk-utility tests of various kinds play a central role in design defect
cases.38 Even if the focus is on consumer expectations, judgments as to
whether reasonable expectations are met may hinge on risk-utility con-
cerns.39 Although risk-utility analysis does have a legitimate legal role, this
status does not protect companies that have undertaken such studies. Jurors
are still free to punish corporations for thinking systematically about risk and
cost.
Undertaking a sound analysis of the benefits and costs of safety im-
provements may be a recipe for being penalized by a jury. In undertaking
such an analysis, a company will become aware of the linkage between a
particular safety improvement and the probability of injury associated with
foregoing that improvement. Moreover, undertaking such an analysis and
making a conscious decision to forego the improvement will subject a com-
pany to the charge that it "deliberately intended to injure the plaintiff." In
the view of the plaintiffs attorneys, a company would only do so for the bas-
est of reasons-financial gain.
Economic analysis of potential safety improvements and environmental
precautions is inherently unpleasant and may offend jurors. Tradeoffs will
and must be made. The unpleasant nature of the exercise does not, however,
imply that companies should not undertake such assessments. Indeed, ra-
tional thinking about risks is exactly what we want to encourage. Such ra-
tional thinking leads to warranted safety improvements, rather than other
safety measures that raise product price but confer negligible gains. As case
studies discussed below indicate, however, undertaking even a sound as-
sessment of costs and benefits often poses substantial hazards to responsible
corporations.
37. See W. Kip VIscusi, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 65-86 (1991); Wade, supra note
4, at 837-38 (offering a list of factors to weigh when determining whether a product is "unreasona-
bly dangerous").
38. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2D (Council Draft No. 1,
1998) (noting that case law in some jurisdictions asserts that defective design is to be determined by
risk-utility balancing, which involves balancing the likelihood and magnitude of foreseeable harm
against the burden of the precaution).
39. See id. § 2C.
[Vol. 52:547
HeinOnline  -- 52 Stan. L. Rev. 566 1999-2000
CORPORATE RISK ANAL YSIS
E. Risk Analysis After Accidents
Risk analyses are certainly valuable for fostering safe product designs.
They are also valuable after accidents as companies attempt to diagnose the
causes of accidents in efforts to improve their safety records. A prominent
class of examples consists of airplane crashes. Indeed, the 1979 American
Airlines DC-10 crash at O'Hare Airport led to a legal battle over what corpo-
rate records had to be shared with the plaintiffs.40 A key issue that American
Airlines lost was whether it had to provide the plaintiffs with the results of its
crash investigation. American Airlines had investigated the causes of the
crash but later destroyed the resulting report on the advice of its counsel.
American Airlines' counsel claimed that the report was covered by attorney-
client privilege. The airline's legal department also instructed the accident
investigators to destroy all supporting notes and copies of the report. The
plaintiffs claimed that this action increased their costs, and the court ruled in
favor of their claim. By not preserving the report, American Airlines led the
court to conclude that the contents of the report would have been damaging:
"The 'adverse inference' rule does apply to this motion, however. That rule
basically holds that upon a party's willful failure to produce evidence, there
is the presumption that the evidence would have been unfavorable to that
party."41
From the standpoint of efficient risk analysis, what should the objective
of the post-crash analysis be? Ideally, it should focus on the causes of the
crash and reasonable potential measures that may reduce such risks in the
future. The analysis should highlight shortcomings that can be fixed to pre-
vent future tragedies. The effect of such a frank assessment, however, could
be to increase the company's liability.
From the standpoint of risk analysis and recordkeeping objectives, com-
panies face a complex Catch 22 situation.42 If they undertake no post-
accident risk evaluation, they might be found irresponsible for failing to ad-
dress the risks that caused the accident. Investigating the cause of a major
accident will be a signal to the jury that the company was concerned for
safety, because learning what caused an accident is often a key ingredient in
preventing recurrences. But a frank post-accident report that is shared with
the plaintiffs could affect the company's liability for the accident if the report
finds fault with the company practices that led to the accident. If, however,
the company fails to maintain or produce such accident reports, it may be
40. See In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois on May 25, 1979, 90 F.R.D. 613 (N.D.
Il. 1981).
41. Id. at 621. For a fuller discussion of this case, see Donald S. Skupsky, Legal Require-
ments for Records Prepared for Internal Investigations and Audits, REC. MGMT. Q., Apr. 1992, at
34.
42. The three unattractive alternatives specified below are based on the analysis by Skupsky,
supra note 41, at 36.
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subject to litigation for not fulfilling its obligation to learn about product
hazards and provide reasonably safe products. From a societal standpoint,
there is a desire both to make the appropriate liability decision for the current
accident and to provide incentives for the corporation to adopt appropriate
safety measures in the future.
The sections below consider a variety of concrete cases in which corpo-
rate risk analyses have played a role in court. In most of these examples
companies were found liable, often for punitive damages. These examples
are not disturbing because the act of carrying out a risk analysis did not
shelter the firm from liability: I am not proposing that doing a risk analysis
immunizes the company against all subsequent liability. But undertaking a
systematic risk analysis should not itself be a trigger for imposing liability.
Moreover, if the analysis is sound and indicates that the costs of a safety
measure exceed the value of the safety benefits it produces, then the firm is
not negligent for foregoing the measure. In such cases, the firm should es-
cape not only punitive damages, but liability altogether.
In some corporate risk analyses, the analysis may not be economically
sound. In such cases, some liability may be warranted. But technical short-
comings in the analysis are not apparent matters of concern in the cases dis-
cussed below. What the attorneys and the jurors reacted to was the fact that
the company had undertaken the analysis, had specifically confronted the
risk decision, and had chosen not to adopt every feasible safety measure.
Whether doing so would have been sensible given the state of information
before the accident never enters as an explicit concern. The practical danger
is that jurors react in hindsight, comparing the cost of the product design
change with the costs to the identified victim, as Judge Easterbrook sug-
gested.4 3 The result is that jurors place insufficient weight on the fact that
adverse outcomes often have very low probabilities. The company must
make a product-wide decision; and cannot identify in advance the potentially
injured parties and craft only those safety improvements that will affect
them.
Im. BENEFIT-COST ANALYSES AT FORD MOTOR COMPANY
A. The Ford Pinto
A useful starting point for considering the role of corporate risk analysis
is the Ford Pinto case, Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co.44 Although the incident
occurred a quarter century ago, it remains perhaps the best-known example
43. See text accompanying note 35 supra.
44. 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
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of a corporate risk analysis provoking public outcry. Moreover, this classic
case embodies many key elements that appear in other cases.
Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co. involved the rear impact of a Ford Pinto.
In 1972, Richard Grimshaw was a thirteen-year-old passenger in a Ford
Pinto that had stalled and come to a stop in the middle of a freeway. A car
that had slowed to approximately thirty miles per hour hit the Pinto from be-
hind, causing a fire that killed the driver and catastrophically injured Grim-
shaw.45
The plaintiff s suit claimed that the placement of the gas tank behind the
rear axle and the design of the fuel filler pipe were defective designs that
created the risk of fire. Grimshaw was awarded more than $2.5 million in
compensatory damages and $125 million in punitive damages.46 The puni-
tive award was subsequently reduced to $3.5 million.47
The most publicized aspect of the Ford Pinto experience was a system-
atic analysis of the benefits and costs of safety improvements. Mother Jones
magazine published the analysis,48 which trial lawyer Stuart Speiser called
"possibly the most remarkable document ever produced in an American law-
suit .....,49 At a press conference, Mother Jones and Ralph Nader released
the analysis. Its story documenting this benefit-cost analysis by Ford engi-
neers received a Pulitzer Prize.0 While the Ford Pinto case dealt with a rear
impact, the engineering analysis undertaken by Ford pertained not to rear
impact crashes but to rollover risks and a regulation that had been proposed
by the NHTSA.5 ' Nevertheless, the analysis demonstrates how corporate
engineers undertake safety studies. Moreover, this same kind of analysis has
been the subject of other Ford and General Motors risk assessments.
Table 4 highlights the components of the Ford Pinto benefit-cost analy-
sis. The character of the risks was estimated using data from a broader car
population. Panel A lists potential injuries and Ford engineers' unit esti-
mates of the values for these injuries.5 2 Ford estimated potential risks as 180
45. See id. at 359.
46. See id. at 358.
47. See generally Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L. REV.
1013 (1991) (describing the public debate and misconceptions surrounding the case).
48. See Mark Dowie, Pinto Madness, MOTHER JONES, Sept.-Oct. 1977, at 2.
49. STUART M. SPEISER, LAWSUIT 357 (1980).
50. For a discussion of these events, see Schwartz, supra note 47, at 1017.
51. See id. at 1020-21.
52. For a synopsis of the memorandum, see BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, THE
IMPACT OF PUBLICITY ON CORPORATE OFFENDERS 44 (1983). As Fisse and Braithwaite observed:
In the absence of an offense defined in terms of manufacturing an unjustifiably danger-
ous product, questions of acceptable risk of the kind raised by the Pinto Papers will rarely be
the central subject of inquiry in the context of corporate offenses against the person. This is
unsatisfactory, not only because of the danger of a serious underlying risk being concealed
from society, but also because it may do more harm than good not to face up to the need for
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burn deaths, 180 serious bum injuries, and 2100 burned vehicles. The unit
values applied to these injuries were similar to the value of court awards in
product liability cases at that time,53 as well as to the values used by the
NHTSA in its regulatory analyses.5 4 Each of these values was based on es-
timates of the present value of lost eamings.55 Based on Ford's analysis, the
total cost of not fixing the gas tank design would be $49.6 million. In con-
trast, as indicated in Panel B, the cost of increased safety would be $137.5
million. By this tally, the expected benefits from improved safety were
smaller than the costs; consequently, undertaking the design change was not
worthwhile.
Based on current economic knowledge in the value-of-life area-as op-
posed to the state of economic knowledge a quarter century ago-we know
that a different kind of analysis would have been appropriate.56 In terms of
the mock-juror survey, Ford followed the compensatory damages method for
determining the value of life in Scenario 3 rather than the willingness-to-pay
method in Scenario 4. But as the mock-juror survey indicates, following
Scenario 4 rather than Scenario 3 would probably have affected Ford ad-
versely to the extent that the higher willingness-to-pay value anchors dam-
ages at a higher level.
The basic problem is that jurors do not undertake a comprehensive risk
analysis approach, regardless of its character. Jurors have a tendency to
compare the often very small per-unit safety cost with the costs borne by the
injured victim. Rather than examine the entire market and the associated
benefits and costs, jurors will be offended by, or will not fully understand, a
comprehensive risk-analysis approach and will focus their assessment more
narrowly on the identified victim and the costs of preventing that injury. The
fact that these costs would also have been incurred for thousands of consum-
ers who were not injured will not loom as large, as Judge Easterbrook em-
phasized. Thus, there is a tendency to exhibit "hindsight bias" rather than to
studies of the costs of improving product safety in matters such as that in which Ford was pil-
loried.
Id. at 54.
53. See VISCUSI, supra note 37, at 111.
54. See Schwartz, supra note 47, at 1023-24.
55. Since that time, governmental risk analyses have shifted to an approach based on the
value of a statistical life or the willingness to pay to avoid a statistical death as described above.
See U.S. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, supra note 15, at 633-35; W. Kip Viscusi,
FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE REsPoNsIBiLmES FOR RISK 31 (1992) ("Indeed, the
value-of-life approach is now required by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget as a standard
practice for all new major federal regulations.").
56. If Ford had used today's value-of-life estimates based on the willingness to pay to reduce
risk, then the value of bum deaths would have been much greater. Using a value-of-life estimate of
$3 million per death, for example, preventing the bum deaths alone is worth $540 million, which
exceeds the total costs of eliminating the risk.
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consider the expected costs and expected benefits at the time of the safety
decision.
B. Ford Mustang
A similar kind of risk analysis issue, or what the court viewed as "safety
science management," arose with respect to the placement and design of the
fuel system for the Ford Mustang in Ford Motor Co. v. Stubblefield.7 The
issues raised in this case closely parallel those involved in the Ford Pinto
case. In 1977, Terri Stubblefield was riding in the rear seat of a Ford Mus-
tang II when it was hit from behind while stopped in traffic by a car that was
traveling at approximately sixty miles per hour. The collision caused a "ball
of fire" that engulfed the rear seat and killed Stubblefield.58
The plaintiffs claimed that the fuel system was negligently designed and
placed. Stubblefield's parents based their case on the company's prior
knowledge of the risk, which is the kind of knowledge that is an integral part
of any risk analysis. As a result, the jury awarded $8 million in punitive
damages to deter Ford Motor Company from such conduct in the future. In-
deed, the award was based in large part on the fact that Ford had done a risk
assessment that compared risk with cost and concluded that the safety im-
provements were not worthwhile:
The evidence here was sufficient to authorize the jury to find that the sum
of $8 million was an amount necessary to deter Ford from repeating its conduct;
that is, its conscious decision to defer implementation of safety devices in order
to protect its profits. One internal memo estimated that "the total financial ef-
fect of the Fuel System Integrity program [would] reduce Company profits over
the 1973-1976 cycle by $(109) million," and recommended that Ford "defer
adoption of the [safety measures] on all affected cars until 1976 to realize a de-
sign cost savings of $20.9 million compared to 1974." Another Ford document
referred to a $2 million cost differential as "marginal." 59
The design debate focused on the fuel system for the Ford Mustang II.
The subject of the controversy was management's decision to delay imple-
mentation of protective hardware for the Mustang II fuel tank from 1974 un-
til 1976. The design issues closely parallel those with the Ford Pinto: There
was a possibility that rear-impact crashes would jam the fuel tank into the
rear axle, generating the risk of a fuel-fed fire. As in the Fort Pinto case, the
company's explicit tradeoff of cost for risk became the center of the contro-
versy. Ford engineers recognized the hazard of post-crash, fuel-fed automo-
bile fires and sought guidance on how to proceed from management. Ford
executives decided to delay adoption of any protective device until 1976 in
57. 319 S.E.2d 470,475 (Ga. CL App. 1984).
58. See id. at 474.
59. Id. at 481. Note that from an economic standpoint "marginal" often means "incremental"
rather than "small."
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order to realize design cost savings of $20.9 million. It was not until the fall
of 1976 that Ford adopted a protective polyethylene shield. At no time did
Ford warn consumers of the dangers of post-collision fire in the older models
of the Mustang ]l.60
The plaintiffs' allegations were two-fold. First, the alleged that the com-
pany traded off cost versus risk and knowingly inflicted harm on potential
occupants. Crash tests analyzed in the course of the company's risk analysis
"showed Ford's knowledge of the hazard at a point in time prior to the colli-
sion in which Stubblefield was fatally injured."61 Second, they alleged that
because Ford knew about the potential risk, it had a duty to warn potential
users of the hazard. The scope of any such duty to warn is unclear; not all
products that are not completely risk free are required to carry warnings.
Communicating very small probability risks is quite difficult, particularly
given the myriad potential hazards associated with complex products like
automobiles. It certainly would not be an effective hazard warnings policy
for an automobile company to warn of every potential hazard associated with
the product because doing so would cause problems of information overload.
C. Ford's Seatbelt Failures
Risk analysis became an issue for Ford again in another case, Miles v.
Ford Motor Co.62 In the case, a jury awarded punitive damages-which
were subsequently overturned-after the plaintiff sued Ford because the pas-
senger-side shoulder harness on a seatbelt allegedly failed. Before the colli-
sion, Willie Miles, who was riding on the passenger side, had leaned over to
pick up some trash. When doing so, the shoulder harness spooled out, cre-
ating slack of about six to eight inches. A "tension eliminator" apparently
prevented appropriate rewinding of the belt even though the belt appeared to
be snug. In the collision, the shoulder harness' failure caused Miles to slide
through his lap belt, which caught his head and produced spinal injuries.
The basis of the claim was that the seatbelt's tension eliminator spool
was defective, leading the occupant to believe that the shoulder harness was
snug when in fact it was loose. The jury found that the design was defective
and that the manufacturer had failed to provide adequate warnings regarding
the defective restraint. Moreover, the company's risk analysis and the
knowledge of the hazard incorporated in this analysis played a substantial
role in the plaintiff s case:
Syson [the plaintiff's accident reconstruction expert] testified that he was
familiar, during the relevant time period, with the corporate policies of Ford
60. See id. at 476.
61. Id. at479.
62. 922 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. App. 1996), remanded for procedural errors, Ford Motor Co. v.
Miles, 967 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. 1998).
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Motor Company as they related to potentially defective products. Syson testi-
fied that when Ford identified what it believed was a defective product it would
first run a "cost benefit" analysis to see what the cost would be to fix or repair
the defect. Next, Ford would assign arbitrary values to each death or serious
injury and would predict the number of occurrences which would involve either
death or serious injury. Finally, Ford would determine the cost to litigate such
deaths and injuries. Syson testified that if the cost to repair the defect exceeded
the other costs, Ford would not correct the defect.6 3
Notwithstanding the fact that the company undertook such an economic
analysis, the court reversed the punitive damages award. Ford was fortunate
in that its analysis was based on a regulatory analysis similar to the one un-
dertaken by the NHTSA. As a result, the court concluded that the evidence
was "barely sufficient to find ordinary negligence" and fell "far short of sup-
porting a finding of gross negligence," much less malice.64 As the court
noted: "Ford relied on studies by NHTSA that consistently showed the risk-
utility balance of tension eliminators weighed in favor of overall safety, and
that the kind of tension eliminators Ford used were not unreasonably danger-
ous."65 Thus, the court stated, "[W]hile Ford's decision to use the tension
eliminators may have turned out to be a mistake (ordinary negligence), it
certainly cannot be said to have been a decision in conscious indifference to
the safety of its customers or in spite of a known extreme risk or harm."66
Being vindicated by an explicit government regulatory risk assessment is
the exception rather than the norm. As in Scenario 4, the jury was not
swayed by a risk analysis that followed the guidelines used by the responsi-
ble federal regulatory agency, but instead penalized the firm with punitive
damages. Upon appeal, the court overturned the jury's irrational punitive
damages award. This appeal was aided by the fact it was the NHTSA studies
themselves that, in effect, constituted the risk analysis. Had Ford instead
relied on its own studies-but still used the NHTSA methodology, as in Sce-
nario 4-the outcome might have been much less favorable.
IV. PRODUCT-RISK ANALYSES AT GENERAL MOTORS
General Motors faced a fuel tank issue analogous to that in the Ford
Pinto case in two cases. The first was a 1998 Georgia case, Moseley v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp.,67 which involved a side saddle fuel tank design that had
been the target of numerous other lawsuits.68 In this particular case, Moseley
63. Miles v. Ford Motor Co., 922 S.W.2d at 588-89.
64. Id. at 589.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 590.
67. Moseley v. General Motors Corp., 447 S.E.2d 302 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994), revd, Webster v.
Boyett, 496 S.E.2d 459 (Ga. 1998).
68. See Moseley, 477 S.E. 2d at 306.
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was driving a GM pickup truck that was hit broadside by a drunk driver of
another pickup truck. Moseley survived the crash and suffered no internal
injuries, but the gas tank ruptured and the truck caught fire, and Moseley was
burned alive after impact. The jury concluded that the product defect per-
tained not simply to the placement of the fuel tanks, but also to the straps that
bound the tank to the car and could potentially puncture the tank.69
In terms of the overall risk posed by this particular truck design, GM
trucks did not fare much worse than Ford trucks: The GM trucks had 1.51
deaths per 10,000 crashes, as compared to 1.45 deaths per 10,000 crashes for
Ford.70 GM's extensive testing of the fuel tank system was the object of the
litigation. The truck exceeded NHTSA standards by a substantial degree:
From a regulatory standpoint, the truck design was not inadequate. But a key
witness in the case presented the detailed GM analysis of fuel-fed fires and
the costs of eliminating them, making "they knew" the "constant refrain
among the jurors interviewed."71 The jury awarded the plaintiffs $4 million
in compensatory damages, $1 in pain and suffering, and $101 million in pu-
nitive damages. To calculate the punitive damages amount, the jurors en-
gaged in an arbitrary mathematical exercise. They awarded an amount equal
to twenty dollars for each of the 500,000 GM trucks on the road, and added a
bonus $1 million "exclamation point."72
The tank placement did have a constructive purpose in the vehicle de-
sign. GM wanted the truck to have a large fuel capacity so that drivers
would not need to refuel the trucks frequently. Achieving this objective re-
quired the use of two tanks located outside of the frame rails that comprise
the underbody of the truck.
In a 1973 analysis, GM engineer Edward Ivey prepared a benefit-cost
analysis of the fuel fed fire fatality issue.73 It is instructive to review this
analysis in detail. Consider first his calculation of the health costs associated
with fuel fed fires. Based on Ivey's "value analysis," there would be a
maximum of "500 fatalities per year in accidents with fuel fed fires where
the bodies were burnt."74 He assigned each fatality a value of $200,000, thus
following the same approach taken in the Ford Pinto analysis. Multiplying
five hundred fatalities by the value of $200,000 each, and dividing by the
forty-one million GM automobiles currently on the highways, yielded an
estimated fatality cost of approximately $2.40 per automobile. He then
69. Seeid. at311-12.
70. See Terence Moran, GMBurns Itself, AM. LAw., Apr. 1993, at 68, 83 (describing the trial
strategies, proceedings, and deliberations in Moseley).
71. Id. at 69.
72. Id.
73. Memorandum from E.C. Ivey, Value Analysis of Auto Fuel Fed Fire Related Fatalities,
General Motors (June 29, 1973) (on file with the Stanford Law Review).
74. Id. at 2.
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amended this calculation to focus on new models sold during the current
model year, for which he estimated fifty-five fatalities for the five million
new models, leading to an estimated accident cost of $2.20 per new-model
automobile.
He concluded:
This analysis indicates that for G.M. it would be worth approximately $2.20 per
new model auto to prevent a fuel fed fire in all accidents.... This analysis must
be tempered with two thoughts. First, it is really impossible to put a value on
human life. This analysis tried to do so in an objective manner but a human fa-
tality is really beyond value, subjectively. Secondly, it is impossible to design
an automobile where fuel fed fires can be prevented in all accidents unless the
automobile has a non-flammable fuel.75
It is noteworthy that this analysis pertains to fuel fed fires more gener-
ally, and not to those in the specific target population of vehicles that was the
object of the litigation. It is likely that the risks will be quite different for
trucks with side saddle fuel tanks rather than the entire fleet of motor vehi-
cles sold by GM. Consequently, the Ivey memo is not directly pertinent to
the specific aspects of the Moseley case, except insofar as the memo indi-
cated the character of corporate thinking. As in the case of the Ford Pinto
analysis, the $200,000 value per fatality uses a compensatory damages
measure of the value of life, which was the approach used by NHTSA at that
time. This amount is smaller than the willingness-to-pay measure of the
value of life developed later in the economics literature.76
The GM approach was consistent with state-of-the-art research on value-
of-life estimates at that time. Just as companies should be judged against the
state-of-the-art with respect to scientific knowledge pertaining to safety de-
signs rather than the state of future knowledge, they should not be expected
to have applied methods of analysis that had not been developed by eco-
nomic literature until after the corporate decisions in question were made. In
the 1970s the dominant approach to measuring the value of life was the hu-
man capital method, which focused on the present value of the lost earnings
of the deceased. This was, for example, the basis for the government's ap-
proach with respect to traffic safety.77 Indeed, the first estimates of the value
of life from a prevention standpoint using the appropriate concept of the
75. Id.
76. For instance, using data from the early 1970s, the estimated willingness to pay measure of
the value of life is $3 million in more recent dollars, or $1 million in 1969 dollars. See W. Kip
VISCUSI, EMPLOYMENT HAZARDS: AN INVESTIGATION OF MARKET PERFORMANCE 263 (1979)
(examining the health and safety risks associated with employment and the method by which work-
ers attach implicit dollar values to the possibilities of death and injury).
77. See Schwartz, supra note 47, at 1025-26. Articulation of this approach in the literature
appears in Dorothy P. Rice & Barbara S. Cooper, The Economic Value of Life, 57 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 1954 (1967).
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value of a statistical life did not occur until later in the 1970S.78 Federal
agencies did not use this concept until 1982, after a debate between the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the U.S. Office of
Management and Budget over the merits of the proposed hazardous commu-
nication regulation,9 which was appealed to then-Vice President Bush.
Based on OSHA's analysis using human capital assessments, which he
termed the "costs of death," the costs of the regulations exceeded the bene-
fits. Using the willingness-to-pay measure of the value of life, however, the
benefits exceeded the costs.80 For all contemporary benefit-cost analyses,
one would expect the value-of-life measure to reflect the willingness-to-pay
value, as in Scenario 4.
The Ivey memo played a pivotal role in the July 9, 1999 Los Angeles
jury verdict against GM in a case involving a rear-end crash, which involved
a rear-end crash into a 1979 Chevrolet Malibu.81 The record-setting verdict
consisted of $107.8 million in compensatory damages for the six bum vic-
tims as well as $4.8 billion in punitive damages. Many observers speculated
that the 1997 and 1998 landmark cigarette settlements of the state attorneys
general lawsuits provided an anchor that led the jury to think in terms of bil-
lions of dollars rather than millions.82
The basic facts of the case are similar to those of many other bum injury
cases. On Christmas Eve in 1993, Patricia Anderson was driving home from
church with her four children and a friend of the family. After slowing to
stop for a red light, her Chevrolet Malibu was hit from the rear by a drunk
driver believed to be going fifty miles per hour by the plaintiffs and seventy
miles per hour by the defendant. The ensuing fire in the Malibu caused se-
vere bum injuries to the passengers, including some disfigurement.
78. See, e.g., VisCusI, supra note 76, at 241-63 (finding that a sample of 496 blue-collar
workers put an implicit value on life of approximately $1 million in 1969 dollars); Robert S. Smith,
The Feasibility of an "Injury Tax" Approach to Occupational Safety, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
730 (1974) (examining the feasibility of a public policy approach to occupational safety and health
under which the government would levy a monetary penalty on firms for each case of work injury
or disease); Richard Thaler & Sherwin Rosen, The Value of Saving a Life: Evidence from the Labor
Market, in HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION 265 (Nestor E. Terleckyj ed., 1975)
(examining and proposing methods for estimating the value of life using an individual's own will-
ingness to pay for increased safety).
79. The hazard communication regulation "would have required labeling and other forms of
risk communication for all risky chemicals used in manufacturing." See VISCUSI, supra note 55, at
262.
80. See id. The analysis that led to the adoption of the value-of-life principles in the federal
government is in W. Kip Viscusi, Analysis of OMB and OSHA Evaluations of the Hazardous
Communication Proposal, report prepared for Secretary of Labor Raymond Donovan (March 15,
1982) (on file with author).
81. See Pollack, Jury Verdict, supra note 1, at AS.
82. See O'Neill, Weinstein & Malnic, supra note 2, at Al; Frank Swoboda & Caroline E.
Mayer, A $4.9 Billion Message: Jury Hits GM with Historic Crash Verdict, WASH. POST, July 10,
1999, at Al.
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Once again the Ivey memo played a prominent role in the courtroom
battle even though GM maintained that the memo did not contribute to the
vehicle's design.83 The cost of a safer design that could have prevented the
injury by moving the gas tank twenty inches away from the rear bumper
rather than eleven inches was $8.59 per vehicle, according to evidence pre-
sented by the plaintiffs.84 The Ivey memo loomed particularly large as the
plaintiffs attorney claimed that it showed that GM was "caught red
handed."85 According to Ivey's analysis, the cost to the company of fuel
tank fires was $2.40 per vehicle. Linking the memo with the $8.59 figure,
which Ivey did not do, implied that the costs of safety to the company out-
weighed the benefits.
The plaintiffs lawyers demonized the GM decision as the result of an
immoral calculation. As one of the lawyers observed after the trial, "'The
jurors wanted to send a message to General Motors that human life is more
important than profits."'86 After the trial, jurors highlighted this tradeoff:
"Jurors told reporters that they felt the company had valued life too lightly.
'We're just like numbers, I feel, to them,' one juror, Carl Vangelisti, told
Reuters. 'Statistics. That's something that is wrong."'87
By their very nature risk analyses convert life and death issues into sta-
tistics. Moreover, benefit-cost tests intrinsically involve cost-health tradeoffs
that some may find shocking. One juror reflected a zero-risk mentality rather
than a more rational risk tradeoff mentality in her comment: "There was no
evidence that the car they put out there was as safe as what they could have
put out there."88 But making such tradeoffs is inevitable. The task for the
courts and society is to overcome the kinds of biases shown in the experi-
mental results and vividly evidenced in the GM case.
Jurors' reckless disregard for rationality is reflected in their justification
for the $4.8 billion punitive damages award. The jurors selected that figure
by linking it to General Motors' advertising expenses over a long period.89
Linking damages to advertising expenses is entirely arbitrary. The amount
was also "two-thirds more than GM's entire profit for 1998,"90 which is a
benchmark that shows the award magnitude, but is also unrelated to safety
decisions for 1979 Chevrolet Malibus. This kind of voodoo economics
83. See Pollack, Jury Verdict, supra note 1, at AS; Jeffrey Ball & Milo Geyelin, GM Ordered
by Jury to Pay $4.9 Billion, WALL ST. J., July 12, 1999, at A3.
84. See Pollack, Jury Verdict, supra note 1, at AS.
85. Jury Awards $4.9 Billion to Crash Victims, Finds GM Bargained Away Passenger Safety,
BNA PROD. SAFETY & LiAB. REP., July 16, 1999, at 721.
86. Pollack, Jury Verdict, supra note 1, at AS.
87. Id.
88. See Ball & Geyelin, supra note 83.
89. See Michael White, Jury Orders GMto Pay $4.9 Billion, CI. TRku., July 10, 1999, at 1.
90. Swoboda & Mayer, supra note 82.
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which the jury viewed as a sound basis for decisions contrasts with the much
more reasoned balancing in the Ivey memo. As the Washington Post ob-
served, such punitive damages awards "send a message to the public at large
that the courts are more like a casino than a hall ofjustice."91
Undertaking at least part of a benefit-cost analysis and making some
judgments regarding the desirability of safety measures is not unique to these
specific cases. For example, the plaintiffs in another case focused on alleg-
edly faulty door latches in the Chevrolet Blazer. The plaintiffs claimed that
GM estimated a $216 million parts cost and a $700 million labor cost if a
recall was initiated, for a total amount of $916 million.92 Evidence of an in-
temal timeline of GM's cost analysis, which indicated that GM knew of the
safety latch problem and what it would cost to fix it, contributed to a $150
million damage award, of which $100 million was for punitive damages, in
the case of a man paralyzed after his Blazer crashed.93 Indeed, even more
fundamental efforts by the company to learn about its products' dangers,
such as crash test results and video tapes of those crash tests, can and have
been used against it in litigation.94
These and other cases show that courts split on how to treat defendants'
knowledge of safety issues. Courts should uniformly incorporate benefit-
cost analysis, risk-utility tests, and balancing efforts into negligence stan-
dards. This is the goal of our legal system and regulatory oversight efforts.
In practice, however, undertaking a thorough analysis of the risks, comparing
the risk costs and benefits, and then, in accordance with the result of the risk
analysis, proceeding not to undertake the most vigilant safety measures iden-
tified may severely damage a company if jurors regard this knowledge as
grounds for punitive damages.
This review of cases indicates that juries often regard corporate risk
analyses as red flags. Rather than indicating concern with appropriate safety
levels, such risk assessments may be viewed as an indication of callous dis-
regard for human health. The evidence in the case analyses is consequently
quite consistent with the mock juror evidence.95
91. Casino Justice, WASH. PosT, July 13, 1999, at A18.
92. See J. Stratton Shartel, Defense Timeline Plays Key Role in Trial Against GM, INSIDE
Lrr., July 1996, at 1, 3.
93. See Hardy v. General Motors Corp., No. CV-93-56 (Cir. Ct. Lowndes Co. Ala., June 3,
1996), which is discussed in detail in Shartel, supra note 92, at 1-4.
94. See Misener v. General Motors, 165 F.R.D. 105, 106-08 (D. Utah 1996) (holding that
videotape and data from manufacturers' crash tests were admissible to demonstrate seat belt's de-
fect and manufacturer's notice thereof).
95. The controlled experimental case scenarios offered the additional advantage of isolating
the incremental influence of particular aspects of the case, such as the type of risk analysis per-
formed.
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V. PHARMACEUTICALS-RISK ANALYSIS WITH
GOVERNMENT SUPERVISION
The automobile industry case studies for the most part consisted of risk
analyses undertaken independently by the automobile companies. Although
jurors might be able to find flaws in those studies, if such studies are ap-
proved by a government agency and adhere to strict guidelines then matters
should be quite different. Corporations presumably should never be subject
to punitive damages for products passing a governmental risk analysis. The
pharmaceutical industry provides a valuable case study in this regard because
its products are subject to extremely stringent regulation by the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA). In particular, all new drugs must meet rigid
standards for safety and efficacy and appropriate risk-balancing criteria be-
fore the agency approves them.
Before a company can market a prescription drug, it must first obtain
FDA approval. As part of this approval process, the applicant must provide
substantial pre-marketing safety information based on human clinical trials.
The first stage of this process typically involves the submission of an appli-
cation to conduct clinical trials to investigate a new drug. The application
must be submitted with information on the drug's chemistry, pharmacology,
and the results of animal toxicology tests.96 These trials may then begin,
provided the FDA does not either request more information or modify the
protocol submitted by the company for the proposed clinical trials. From a
practical standpoint, the FDA often dictates the nature of the protocols. The
clinical trial process consists of three phases. Phase 1 trials are designed to
elicit information about "the metabolism and pharmacologic actions of the
drug in humans, [and] the side effects associated with increasing
doses... ... "97 These tests are also intended to provide information on prod-
uct safety. These Phase 1 trials typically involve tests on a small number of
healthy adults-approximately twenty to eighty people.98 If the Phase 1 tri-
als are successful, the company then proceeds to Phase 2 trials, which typi-
cally involve testing the drug on several hundred people who have the spe-
cific disease or condition for which the product is targeted.99 The Phase 2
trials are "conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug for a particular
indication or indications in patients with the disease or condition under
96. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.21-.22 (1999).
97. Id. § 312.21(a)(1).
98. See id.
99. See id. § 312.21(b).
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study .... -100 In addition, these trials are intended to assess whether there
are adverse side effects associated with the drug.1o If the Phase 2 trials are
also successful, the company proceeds to Phase 3 clinical trials involving
from several hundred to several thousand patients who also have the specific
condition or disease for which the drug is targeted.102 As the Phase 3 trials
conclude, the company submits a new drug application (NDA) to the FDA to
obtain permission to sell the pharmaceutical product. The NDA must in-
clude both safety and efficacy information; it is a compendium of all the data
obtained during the three phases regarding the performance of the drug with
respect to these two objectives. In addition, the NDA must include details on
the proposed labeling for the new drug.103
Before approving the drug, the FDA must determine that the drug is safe
and that there is "substantial evidence" of the efficacy of the drug for its pro-
posed uses.104 Drugs are typically not risk-free, and prescription drugs are
available by prescription only because of their risks. Before approving the
drug, the FDA in effect makes a risk-benefit judgment that making the drug
available is in society's best health interest.105 This process is so stringent
that some critics of the FDA have suggested the onerous FDA process de-
prives patients of beneficial new drugs.0 6
There have been some attempts to recognize that pharmaceuticals are
quite different from other products. The drafters of the Restatement (Second)
100. Id.
101. See id.
102. See id. § 312.21(c).
103. For the requirements for a new drug application, see id. § 314.50.
104. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (1994 & Supp. IH 1997).
"[S]ubstantial evidence" means evidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled investiga-
tions, including clinical investigations, by experts qualified ... to evaluate the effectiveness of
the drug involved, on the basis of which it could fairly and responsibly be concluded by such
experts that the drug will have the effect it purports or is represented to have under the condi-
tions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling or proposed labeling
thereof.
Id.
105. See Bruce N. Kuhlik & Richard F. Kingham, The Adverse Effects of Standardless Puni-
tive Damage Awards on Pharmaceutical Development and Availability, 45 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J.
693, 694-97 (1990); Richard A. Merrill, Compensation for Prescription Drug Injuries, 59 VA. L.
REV. 1, 1 (1973).
106. See, e.g., HENRY G. GRABOwsKI & JOHN M. VERNON, THE REGULATION OF PHARMA-
CEUTICALS: BALANCING THE BENEFITS AND RISKS 46-47 (1983); William M. Wardell, Introduc-
tion of New Therapeutics Drugs in the United States and Great Britain: An International Compari-
son, 14 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 773, 787 (1973). But see William M. War-
dell, Mohammed Hassar, Sadanand N. Anavekar & Louis Lasagna, The Rate of Development of
New Drugs in the United States, 1963 through 1975, 24 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY &
THERAPEUTICS 133, 139 (1978) (reporting that the FDA approved approximately 88% of NDAs
submitted between 1963 and 1970).
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of Torts, in comment k to section 402A, indicated that strict liability was not
meant to apply to "unavoidably unsafe products," for which drugs and vac-
cines serve as prominent examples:
k Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in the
present state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for
their intended and ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of
drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of ra-
bies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging consequences
when it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death,
both the marketing and the use of the vaccine are fully justified, not withstand-
ing the unavoidable high degree of risk which they involve. Such a product,
properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warnings, is not
defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of many other
drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which for this very reason cannot legally
be sold except to physicians, or under the prescription of a physician.10 7
Notwithstanding the American Law Institute's position, courts have
found that prescription drugs are not inherently dangerous. Rather, judges
have generally applied comment k on a case-by-case basis.108 Moreover,
courts have not recognized compliance with the requirements of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act as a complete defense to a product liability
action.109 Only five states have recognized compliance with FDA require-
ments as a defense against punitive damages.110 I believe the regulatory
compliance defense against punitive damages should be adopted more gener-
ally. Furthermore, it should be expanded to include all corporate risk analy-
ses that comply with procedures established for the assessment of federal
regulations and for which the costs of additional safety measures outweigh
their benefits. Thus, in order to find a company liable, jurors would have to
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).
108. See, e.g., Hill v. Searle Lab., 884 F.2d 1064, 1069 (8th Cir. 1989) ("The drafters of
comment k did not intend to grant all manufacturers of prescription drugs a blanket exception to
strict liability.'); Toner v. Lederle Lab., 732 P.2d 297, 308 (Idaho 1987) (stating that comment k
does not apply to all drugs, but rather applies"'when the situation calls for it"'); Feldman v. Lederle
Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 380 (NJ. 1984) ("We do not agree that the protective shield of comment k
immunizes all prescription drugs. Moreover, we are of the opinion that generally the principle of
strict liability is applicable to manufacturers of prescription drugs.").
109. Jeffrey N. Gibbs & Bruce F. Mackler, Food and Drug Administration Regulation and
Products Liability: Strong Sword, Weak Shield, 22 TORT & INS. L.J. 194, 243 (1987) (stating that
compliance with FDA regulation provides "only modest protection against the successful lawsuit");
Thomas Scarlett, The Relationship Among Adverse Drug Reaction Reporting, Drug Labeling,
Product Liability, and Federal Preemption, 46 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 31, 39 (1991) (noting that
compliance with government standards is merely a factor in determining liability).
110. The five states proscribing punitive damages in situations in which the manufacturer has
complied with FDA requirements are: Arizona, ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-701 (West 1992);
New Jersey, NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-5c (West 1987); Ohio, OHro REv. CODE ANN. §
2307.801(C)(I)(a) (Anderson 1998); Oregon, OR. REv. STAT. § 30.927 (1993); and Utah, UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-18-2(1) (1992).
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explicitly determine that either the risk analysis did not comply with the
standards established by the U.S. government for regulatory evaluation or
that the benefits of additional safety did in fact exceed the costs. For situa-
tions in which federal agencies have made explicit judgments along these
lines, as in the instance of the Ford shoulder harness assessment, there would
be no need to reassess the merits of the safety improvement.
Vaccines represent a classic case of risk-benefit tradeoffs: They typi-
cally the risk of an adverse reaction, but the vaccine itself has direct health
benefits. FDA litigation over the diptheria, tetanus, and pertussis (DPT) vac-
cine in the 1980s reflects how jurors focus on the identified lives that are the
object of the tort liability cases instead of the statistical lives that have been
saved through a beneficial vaccine product.
On one hand, early estimates based on the medical literature in the early
1980s indicated that the DPT vaccine was responsible for as many as twenty-
five serious adverse reactions annually, including brain damage and some
occasional deaths. It is now believed, however, that these early risk esti-
mates were overstated."' On the other hand, the vaccine offers substantial
health benefits. A study by scientists at the Centers for Disease Control es-
timated that in the absence of the pertussis vaccine program, there would be
approximately 322,000 additional cases of whooping cough per year, result-
ing in more than 400 additional annual deaths.112 Notwithstanding the
FDA's judgment that the product passed a risk-benefit test, the DPT vaccine
created a risk of multi-million dollar verdicts against the companies that pro-
duced it. The result was that manufacturers found it more attractive to aban-
don the vaccine market altogether than to incur this considerable liability
hazard.113
111. See James D. Cherry, 'Pertussis Vaccine Encephalopathy" It Is Time to Recognize It As
the Myth That It Is, 263 JAMA 1679, 1679 (1990) ("It is now the last decade of the 20th century,
and it is time for the myth of pertussis vaccine encephalopathy to end."); Vincent A. Fulginiti, A
Pertussis Vaccine Myth Dies, 144 AM. J. DISEASES CHILDREN 860, 860 (1990) ("Over the years, I
have been persuaded by a growing body of evidence that the so-called pertussis vaccine encepha-
lopathy does not exist."); cf Kim R. Wentz & Edgar K. Marcuse, Diphtheria-Tetanus-Pertussis
Vaccine and Serious Neurologic Illness: An Updated Review of the Epidemeologic Evidence, 87
PEDIATRICS 287, 295 (1991) ("There is an association between DTP vaccine and serious acute
neurologic illness. The magnitude of this association is probably between I case of neurologic
illness per 100,000 immunizations and 1 case per million immunizations.").
112. See Alan R. Hinman & Jeffery P. Koplan, Pertussis and Pertussis Vaccine: Reanalysis of
Benefits, Risks, and Costs, 251 JAMA 3109,3112-13 (1984).
113. See Peggy J. Naile, Tort Liabilityfor DPT Vaccine Injury and the Preemption Doctrine,
22 IND. L. REV. 655, 703 (1989) (explaining that large damages awards "are ... likely to induce
manufacturers to abandon the vaccine market altogether").
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Liability hazards led many firms to exit the vaccine market.114 Now
there are only single-product monopolies supplying many of the vaccines for
major illnesses, including polio, measles, rabies, mumps, and rubella. This
monopoly pattern includes many pediatric vaccines as well.115 In addition,
the litigation has caused vaccine prices to surge because higher liability costs
to manufacturers raised the marginal cost of supplying vaccines.116 Eco-
nomic theory suggests that increased immunization costs may have caused a
decline in vaccination rates in the United States.1 7
The importance of an expanded regulatory compliance defense can be
seen by examining the extent to which pharmaceuticals have been the target
of litigation despite the FDA's view that such products on balance are bene-
ficial. Table 5 summarizes several examples of punitive damages cases.
Oral contraceptives, for example, have long been a target of litigation, lead-
ing to substantial liability awards.118 Indeed, the National Academy of Sci-
ence has concluded that litigation for oral contraceptives was sufficiently
onerous that it served as a principal deterrent for the development of new
contraceptive devices in the United States.19
Another prominent example is the Bendectin litigation. Bendectin was a
prescription drug that pregnant woman took from 1957 to 1983 to reduce the
symptoms of morning sickness. An estimated thirty million women took this
drug.120 The FDA approved Bendectin in 1956, and is still approved for use
today.121 Although the FDA concluded that pregnant women's use of Ben-
114. See generally AM. MED. ASS'N BD. OF TRUSTEES, Impact of Product Liability on the
Development of New Medical Technologies, 137 AM. MED. Ass'N PROC. HOUSE OF DELEGATES
79, 83-86 (1988) (discussing the impact of product liability on vaccine manufacturers).
115. See generally Vaccine Injury Compensation: Hearing on H.R. 1780, H.R. 4777, and H.R.
5184 Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 99th Cong. 113-14 (1987) (statement of Representative Fred J. Eckert) (describing a
serious decline in the number of vaccine manufacturers in the United States).
116. See AM. MED. ASS'N BD. OF TRUSTEES, supra note 114, at 7; see also Gina Kolata, Liti-
gation Causes Huge Price Increases in Childhood Vaccines, 232 SCIENCE 1339, 1339 (1986)
(documenting the huge increase in DPT vaccine prices and the large portion of the price going to-
ward product liability insurance).
117. See Sara Rosenbaum, Rationing Without Justice: Children and the American Health
System, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1859, 1867-68 (1992).
118. See e.g., Wooderson v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 681 P.2d 1038, 1038 (Kan. 1984).
119. See NAT'L RES. COUNCIL & INST. OF MED., DEVELOPING NEW CONTRACEPTIVES:
OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES 141 (1991) (finding that the unpredictable nature of litigation is a
significant disincentive for contraceptive research and development).
120. See Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (stating
that 30 million pregnant women used Bendectin between 1957, when it was first marketed and
1983, when Richardson-Merrell discontinued marketing the drug).
121. See id. at 824; KENNETH R. FOSTER & PETER W. HUBER, JUDGING SCIENCE:
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 24 (1997).
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dectin is safe for their unborn children,122 the wave of Bendectin litigation
ultimately cost manufacturers so much that they stopped marketing the prod-
uct. Although no jury verdict that Bendectin causes birth defects has ever
been upheld on appeal, plaintiffs have received a favorable verdict in ap-
proximately 36% of the cases that have gone to trial.123 The risk of juror er-
ror coupled with high litigation costs led manufacturers to withdraw Ben-
dectin from the market notwithstanding the continuing assessment by the
FDA and the scientific community that Bendectin provides benefits exceed-
ing its risks.
The Bendectin cases are particularly noteworthy in that the punitive
damages awards are often substantial-as high as $75 million in one in-
stance. But the Bendectin cases are also distinctive in that the punitive dam-
age awards, and in some cases the verdicts themselves, have been overturned
on appeal. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals also incurred substantial litigation
costs to fend off these potentially catastrophic lawsuits.
Not all the defendants succeeded in avoiding damage awards. In the last
case listed in Table 5, for example, the jury awarded not only compensatory
damages of $9 million, but also punitive damages of $35 million. Moreover,
in that situation there was an additional lawsuit against the physician, who
paid $500,000 in compensatory damages and $23.5 million in punitive dam-
ages.
There are three principal messages conveyed by the cases listed in Table
5. First, compensatory damages involving pharmaceuticals often range in
the millions. Companies must pay these damages notwithstanding the FDA
drug approval process. Second, juries often award punitive damages that are
larger than the compensatory damages and that are inconsistent with regula-
tory compliance. Finally, courts often recognize the inappropriateness of
punitive damages and frequently overturn these awards. But the appeals
process is expensive, and risk-averse companies may settle out of court
122. This conclusion is consistent with the scientific community's position as well. See, e.g.,
Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 959 F.2d. 1349, 1353-56 (6th Cir. 1992) (describing 35 epide-
miological studies which found no evidence that Bendectin caused birth defects); Wilson v. Merrell
Dow Pharm., Inc., 893 F.2d 1149, 1154-55 (10th Cir. 1990) (affirming a judgment n.o.v. for the
manufacturer based in part on approximately 40 epidemiological studies that failed to find a con-
nection between Bendectin and birth defects).
123. For a review of Bendectin litigation, see generally Joseph Sanders, Jury Deliberation in
a Complex Case: Havner v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, JusT. SYs. J., March 1993, at 45 (ana-
lyzing jury deliberations in the Havner case); Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case
Study in the Life Cycle of Mass Torts, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 301 (1992) (exploring the rapid decline in
the rate of plaintiffs' success in Bendectin lawsuits).
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rather than face the legal and financial uncertainties involved with such high-
stakes lotteries.
In some of the cases listed in Table 5 the plaintiff suggested that the de-
fendant falsified lab reports, did inadequate testing, or failed to inform the
FDA of side effects of the drug. If the company did in fact withhold or mis-
represent significant information, then the FDA could impose regulatory
sanctions. From a practical standpoint, pharmaceutical firms receive infor-
mation about potential adverse reactions on a continuing basis. A single pa-
tient with an unfavorable outcome could lead to such a report. But without a
large sample and a controlled experiment to determine that the drug caused
the adverse outcome, the company may not have any information to report to
the FDA. Once a pattern of adverse reactions becomes established, however,
it becomes clear in hindsight that the earlier reports did signal a potential
problem. Still, until a large amount of information becomes available, it is
often impossible to make reliable judgments regarding adverse effects.
Compensatory damages for the victim combined with sanctions imposed by
the regulatory agency should be sufficient to deter companies from deceiving
the FDA.
The examples I have discussed are not isolated incidents, but reflect a
broader pattern of litigation against the pharmaceutical industry. Many drugs
that remedy health problems have adverse side effects; society's task is to
select those drugs with net beneficial health effects. The FDA's approval
process is designed to help us do so. The difficulty is that jurors often sec-
ond-guess these judgments, making the pharmaceutical industry a leading
target for tort actions.
Consider the performance of the pharmaceutical industry during the peak
of the liability crisis, from 1984 to 1986.124 The pharmaceutical industry was
subject to more liability suits in federal courts125 and higher mean damages
awards relative to sales than the rest of the U.S. manufacturing sector.12 6
Moreover, the ratio of liability costs to sales for the pharmaceutical industry
dwarfed that for the rest of the manufacturing industries in the U.S.127
Rather than being immune from liability, pharmaceuticals became the prin-
cipal target during the liability cost explosion. This pattern diminished
124. The statistics cited in this paragraph are based on the evidence for the U.S. federal courts
presented in W. Kip Viscusi, Michael J. Moore & James Albright, A Statistical Profile of Pharma-
ceutical Industry Liability, 1976-1989,24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1418 (1994).
125. See id. at 1421 fig. 1.
126. See id. at 1433 fig. 7. Indeed, in 1985, total awards for the pharmaceutical industry ex-
ceeded those for the rest of the manufacturing sector. See id. at 1431 fig. 6.
127. See id. at 1433 fig. 7.
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thereafter as firms began to settle more cases out of court.128 Nevertheless,
the threat of ruinous liability remains.
What the pharmaceutical experience demonstrates is that even when a
risk-benefit analysis was subject to rigid government guidelines, and was
approved after a careful review by the appropriate government authority,
manufacturers remain exposed to the risk that jurors will second-guess the
safety of their products. Moreover, since jurors will tend to focus on the ac-
tual lives harmed by a product rather than on statistical data regarding ex-
pected lives saved, they will tend to impose excessive punishments.
The most important lesson of the pharmaceutical experience is that for-
malization of a regulatory compliance defense could serve a constructive
role. The rationale for expanding the regulatory compliance defense against
punitive damages is quite strong. Moreover, a similar defense should be
available to corporations in other industries that conduct risk analyses in
compliance with government regulations. Although I will suggest broader
policy reforms in the concluding section, even a limited reform of this nature
would help ensure that sound corporate risk analyses serve an exculpatory
function rather than as a trigger for punitive damages.
CONCLUSION
A major puzzle raised by the performance of the courts is that many of
the most well-known cases involving punitive damages are also those in
which corporations undertook a risk analysis, or in some cases, a sound
benefit-cost analysis. In those cases, jurors chose to award punitive damages
even though thorough internal risk analyses led the defendants to conclude
that no additional safety improvements were warranted. This result is the
opposite of what would occur if the legal system fostered better corporate
risk behavior. More rational thinking about risk and a conscientious effort to
achieve risk-cost balancing in line with society's valuation of safety should
signal corporate responsibility rather than trigger corporate punishment. As
Judge Easterbrook has observed, corporations are well positioned to under-
take such risk analyses and routinely do so in a manner that reflects a degree
of technical knowledge and judgment that a jury is unlikely to share.129
Why do jurors make the mistake of punishing corporations for risk-cost
balancing? A variety of conjectures are possible. People may be averse to
128. See id.
129. See Carroll v. Otis Elevator Co., 896 F.2d 210, 215 (7th Cir. 1990).
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explicitly balancing money against human lives. Money and lives might be
considered incommensurable. Or, jurors might not be adequately trying to
place themselves in the shoes of the corporation at the time of the tradeoff
decision. At the time of the decision, the corporation sees only a small prob-
ability of an accident, not a certainty. In hindsight, a small corporate expen-
diture would have prevented an identifiable death, whereas ex ante the cor-
poration would have had to make that expenditure thousands if not millions
of times to decrease the risk of an abstract person's death. Comparisons in-
volving identified victims and safety costs will overwhelm jurors' sensibili-
ties, particularly for low-probability events with severe consequences. When
corporations systematically think about risk levels yet nevertheless pursue
product or environmental policies that fail to maximize safety, the juror may
regard the corporate decision as "cold-blooded." This difficulty arises, in
part, because of the well-documented role of hindsight bias with respect to
retrospective risk judgments.130 What matters at the time of the corporate
decision is a comparison of the costs of the safety measure with its expected
benefits, which consist of the reduced probability of an accident multiplied
by the value of the likely damage from an accident. But as Judge Easter-
brook observed, jurors tend not to compare the expected benefits and costs.
Rather, after the victim has been identified, they simply compare the loss to
the victim against the costs to save that individual, neglecting the fact that
before the accident the loss was only an abstract probability.
How does such a hindsight bias play out with respect to particular cases?
For the Ford Pinto, the comparison is between a cost of $11 per car to move
the gas tank and the life of the victim of an exploding Pinto. For the GM
fuel tank placement, the comparison is between the $2.20 cost per new car
sold and an identifiable bum death. Once such comparisons are made, the
corporation's decision not to undertake the safety improvement appears ludi-
crous, reckless, and irresponsible. But before the accidents occur, the appro-
priate comparison is between the expected value of the losses that will occur
if the safety improvement is not undertaken and the total cost over the entire
product line of undertaking the safety measure, which will not be as stark a
comparison and may have the opposite implications. These benefit-cost
comparisons also avoid the purely retrospective focus on the identified life
lost after the fact. Instead, it takes the jury back to the time of the corporate
decision.
130. See Reid Hastie, David A. Schkade & John W. Payne, Juror Judgments in Civil Cases:
Hindsight Effects on Judgments of Liability for Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 597
(1999).
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The mock juror analysis made it possible to isolate which factors af-
fected juror beliefs and how they were influential. The most consistent result
across the different scenarios was that undertaking any type of risk analysis
was harmful to the corporation's prospects both with respect to the probabil-
ity of punitive damages and, more importantly, with respect to the magnitude
of the award. Using a willingness-to-pay value of life rather than the com-
pensatory damages value has the perverse effect of anchoring juror awards at
a higher level. Risk analyses and, in particular, analyses that value lives
highly, are harmful to the company's prospects, whereas failing to think
systematically about risks and undervaluing life is a less costly corporate
strategy. The resulting incentives are perverse.
The mock juror analysis also demonstrated the factors that did not affect
participants' judgments on punitive damage awards. The expense of pro-
viding for greater safety should have affected their attitudes, but did not.
Similarly, the total number of deaths might have been a concern, but was not.
This is not clearly a bad result: Increasing the number of deaths and costs
proportionally merely changes the scale of the problem, and does not affect
whether a particular safety feature is worth its costs. Finally, whether the
corporation undertook an erroneous benefit-cost analysis or did the analysis
correctly did not significantly affect the mock jurors' assessment of damages.
That mock jurors did not respond sensibly to these factors, which on their
face should be influential, highlights the value of examining how jurors actu-
ally behave, instead of simply hypothesizing about their behavior.
It is noteworthy that in the survey scenarios in which a benefit-cost
analysis was supplied and the appropriate value of life was used, the costs of
the safety measure exceeded their benefits. This result has important impli-
cations for the appropriate liability of the firm. If the costs of the safety
measure exceed the benefits, the company is not negligent in failing to adopt
it, much less guilty of reckless behavior that would warrant punitive dam-
ages. But undertaking this kind of responsible risk analysis indicates that the
company knew of the risk and intentionally inflicted it on a probabilistic ba-
sis, thus triggering punitive damages in the view of the mock jurors.
The solution to such jury misbehavior is not a narrowly defined legal re-
form. It would not be appropriate to exempt a corporation from punitive
damages merely because it undertook a risk analysis, because the quality and
pertinence of the analysis may be insufficient. But corporate risk analyses in
compliance with federal regulatory guidelines, such as those completed dur-
ing the FDA approval process, should be given a statutory defense against
punitive damages. Such a measure would begin to address current biases.
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Rewriting jury instructions for punitive damages does not seem to be a rea-
sonable solution, since the difficulties arise from cognitive biases and sys-
tematic errors that people make in thinking about risk. The problem is that
jurors are generally not able to make the subtle economic judgments that
should be involved in determining whether punitive damages are awarded
and, if so, how much the award should be. Moreover, rewriting instructions
for juries may not be effective if juries ignore such directives or interpret
them in a manner that fits their desired objectives. The independent charac-
ter of jurors is reflected by the fact that three-fourths of all people agree with
the statement: "Whatever a judge said the law is, jurors should do what they
believe is the right thing."131
There have been a variety of legal reform efforts directed at restraining
punitive damages; those that have been adopted thus far focus primarily on
capping them. But caps do not eliminate the fundamental irrationality that
juries display with respect to punitive damage awards. An alternative pro-
posal is to transfer the responsibility for awarding punitive damages from
jurors to judges. That proposal would remedy jurors' behavior, but would
not be a total solution because judges are not fully rational in their handling
of risk either.132 Elsewhere, I have proposed abolishing punitive damages for
corporate safety and environmental torts. My underlying rationale is that
compensatory damages coupled with market forces and vigorous regulatory
enforcement regimes would be provide adequate incentives to stop compa-
nies from marketing unreasonably dangerous products. Moreover, there is
no statistically significant evidence that abolishing punitive damages would
have any effect on any of a wide variety of measures of safety, ranging from
the rate of toxic chemical spills to product accident rates.133
Because jurors do not evaluate risk analyses and benefit-cost assess-
ments properly, they are not well suited to assess this central component of
corporate action. This inadequacy provides an additional rationale for trans-
ferring the responsibility for deterring corporate misbehavior from the courts
to regulatory agencies. Analyses of the risk consequences of safety designs
or corporate decisions often involve complex technical judgments and so-
phisticated economic analyses, which in many instances exceed the compe-
131. Bob Van Voris, Civil Cases: Jurors Do Not Trust Civil Litigants. Period., NAT'L L.J.,
Nov. 2, 1998, at A24.
132. See W. Kip Viscusi, How Do Judges Think About Risk?, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 26
(2000).
133. See generally W. Kip Viscusi, Why There Is No Defense of Punitive Damages, 87 GEO.
L.J. 381 (1998); W. Kip Viscusi, The Social Costs of Punitive Damages Against Corporations in
Environmental and Safety Torts, 87 GEo. L.J. 285 (1998).
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tence of jury members selected from the population at random. Indeed, the
U.S. Office of Management and Budget has issued detailed economic guide-
lines for how agencies should prepare such assessments. 134 These guidelines
often require complex economic judgments. Government agencies routinely
make these judgments as part of every major new rulemaking. Indeed, they
have been required by executive orders of the President to undertake such
analyses for several decades.135 It is not surprising that jurors without train-
ing and background fail to make technical economic judgments in a sound
manner. What is more disturbing, however, is that sound economic analyses
are not simply treated in a random fashion by jurors but actually damage
companies' prospects in court.
APPENDIX
Sample Description
The sample of 489 adults was recruited by a survey research firm in
Phoenix, Arizona. Subjects were paid an average of $40 to participate in a
one-and-a-half hour survey. Subjects came to a central location where they
participated in this survey. The scenarios discussed in this paper were the
first questions in a longer written survey dealing with risk and legal issues.
The average participant took fifteen minutes to complete the survey.
Table A summarizes the sample characteristics. Overall, 68% of the
sample was female; the average age was forty-five. In terms of racial back-
ground, 80% of the sample was white, 5% was Hispanic, and the remainder
consisted of other minorities.
The educational level of the sample varied greatly: 4% of the sample
had not completed high school; 11% of the sample had professional degrees.
The largest educational group represented was that of people who had some
college education; this group comprised 40% of the sample.
The smoking status variable is in line with national estimates: 23% of
the sample were current smokers and an equal percentage were former
smokers.
In addition to smoking, the other indicator of risk preference was seatbelt
use; 80% of the sample indicated that they always use seatbelts while driving
or riding in a car.
134. See, e.g., U.S. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, supra note 15, at 634.
135. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993); Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3
C.F.R. 127 (1981).
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The sample was not nationally or regionally representative, but it did in-
clude a diverse population mix. Additional statistical analysis using models
to control for the separate influences at work yields estimates of the incre-
mental effect of the scenario manipulations, controlling for the influence of
personal characteristics. These effects are almost identical to those reflected
in the summary of the overall sample mean effects in Table 3.
Although the text described results for the mean response levels, regres-
sion analyses yielded similar results. These regressions took into account
respondents' gender, age, race, education, smoking status, and seatbelt
use.136 Controlling for personal characteristics in regression estimates un-
dertaken by the author but not reported here, the probability that a juror
would award punitive damages increases by 5%, the same as when personal
characteristics are not taken into account. There is a modest effect on the
level of punitive damages award, however. Without controlling for personal
characteristics, undertaking a benefit-cost analysis increases the punitive
damages award by 47%, whereas this value is only 39% when personal char-
acteristics are taken into account.
136. These results are reported in greater detail in Viscusi, supra note 21.
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TABLE 1
JUROR RISK SURVEY VARIATIONS
Scenario - .....t -V .
No Benefit-Cost Analysis
1 No analysis performed, $4 million cost-per-life-saved.
2 No analysis performed, $1 million cost-per-life-saved.
Benefit-Cost Analysis Performed
3 IAnalysis using $800,000 compensatory damages amount to value
life, $4 million cost-per-life-saved.
4 Analysis using NHTSA value of life figure of $3 million to value
life, $4 million cost-per-life-saved.
5 Erroneous analysis using NHTSA value of life figure of $3 mil-
lion to value life, estimated cost-per-life-saved of $4 million but
actual amount was $2 million.
Survey Waves
1 Total lives lost was 10.
2 Total lives lost was 4.
[Vol. 52:547
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TABLE 2
SUMMARY OF EXPERIMENTAL STRUCTURE, HYPOTHESES, AND RESULTS
Experimental Test Hypothesis 'Finding
Scenario I vs. Jurors will impose greater No significant effect.
Scenario 2 sanctions (i.e., increased (tpRoB = 1.58; tMwr = 0.100)
frequency and magnitude of
punitive damages) if safety
improvements are cheaper, or
a lower cost-per-life-saved.
Scenario 1 vs. Jurors will impose greater Significant effect with large
Scenarios 3, 4, 5 sanctions if firms undertake a influence on award level.
risk analysis related to (tpRoB = 2.78***; tcr = 1.85*)
subsequent accidents.
Scenario 3 vs. Jurors will not be as likely to Significant effect in the
Scenario 4 punish corporate risk analysis "wrong" direction as awards
using a higher value of life increase with value of life
and in line with government used.
regulatory practices. (RoB = 0.08; tkrf = 1.05;
Alternative hypothesis: t = 3.36***)
Higher value of life measures
by the company serve as an
anchor that boosts damages
awards.
Scenario 4 vs. Juries will impose greater No significant effect.
Scenario 5 sanctions if corporations (tpRoB= 0.50; t~r = 0.60)
make errors in their risk
analysis.
Scenarios 1-5 (10 deaths) vs. Juries will impose greater No significant effect.
Scenarios 1-5 (4 deaths) sanctions if the number of (tpRoB = 0.80; tAm = 0.43)
lives lost is greater.
Notes: tpRoB is the t-statistic for the difference in punitive award probability means.
tArr is the t-statistic for the difference in award level geometric means.
* - statistically significant at 10% level, two-tailed test
** - statistically significant at 5% level, two-tailed test
- statistically significant at 1% level, two-tailed test
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TABLE 3
JURORS' REACTIONS TO AUTOMOTIVE NEGLIGENCE CASE
PanelA: Scenarios with no Benefit-Cost Analysis by Company
Percent of CGometric
Version of Sample sample favoring mean of P i-n
survey size punitive awards
damages ($ milliom;)
$4 million/life9745251.
(Scenario 1) 97 .845 2.95 1.0
$1 million/life 97 .918 2.86 1.0
(Scenario 2)
Cb analysis 194 
.881 2.91 1.0
Panel B: Scenarios with Benefit-Cost Analysis by Company
Percent of GeometricVersion of Sample sample favoring mean of M-5ri0,:
survey size punitive f wads awnrd
_damages (S millious)
Court costs as value 97 .928 4.02 3.5
(Scenario 3)
NHTSA value of life 102 .931 5.31 10.0
(Scenario 4)
NHTSA value of life, 96 .948 4.50 10.0
error (Scenario 5)
Combined analysisbycmay295 .936 4.59 10.0
by company
Panel C: Full Sample Results
Percent of Geometric
Version of Sample sample favoring mea of ed
survey size punitive j w'irdr
damages (S millions)
Total for all five 489 914 3.85 5-0scenarios L 8 .9438 F .
t-test (punitive damages frequency): t = 2.0958**
t-test (ln punitive damages amount): t = 2.4431*
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TABLE 4
BENEFIT-COST CALCULATIONS FOR THE FORD PINTO
Panel A: Benefit calculations for increased safety in Pinto gas tank design
Outcome of faulty design Ford's unit value Ford's total value
180 burn deaths $200,000 $36 million
180 serious bum injuries $67,000 $12.1 million
2,100 burned vehicles $700 $1.5 million
Total $49.6 million
Panel B: Cost calculations for increased safety in Pinto gas tank design
Number of units Unit cost Total costa
Ill million cars $11 $121 million
1.5 million light trucks $11 $16.5 million
Total $137.5 million
a Excluded is the minor cost component of the lost consumer's surplus of customers
who do not buy Pintos because of the $11 price increase.
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